Rebel Governance in Civil War: Variations in Rebel Governance - A Case Study Analysis. by Sellers, Harriet Ann
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
3-29-2018
Rebel Governance in Civil War: Variations in Rebel
Governance - A Case Study Analysis.
Harriet Ann Sellers
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, hselle4@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the International Relations Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sellers, Harriet Ann, "Rebel Governance in Civil War: Variations in Rebel Governance - A Case Study Analysis." (2018). LSU Master's
Theses. 4660.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/4660
	   	  
	  
REBEL	  GOVERNANCE	  IN	  CIVIL	  WAR:	  

















Submitted	  to	  the	  Graduate	  School	  of	  the	  	  
Louisiana	  State	  University	  
Agricultural	  and	  Mechanical	  College	  
in	  partial	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  
requirements	  for	  the	  degree	  of	  



















Harriet	  Ann	  Sellers	  




Table	  of	  Contents	  
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………	  iii	  
	  
1	  Introduction:	  Governance	  and	  Insurgent	  Groups	  ………..………………………………………………………………………	  1	  
	  
2	  Existing	  Explanations	  of	  Variations	  in	  Rebel	  Governance	  ………..………………………………………………………….	  3	  
	  
3	  Theory:	  The	  Determinants	  of	  Variation	  in	  Rebel	  Governance	  ………..…………………………………………………...	  9	  
3.1	   Winning	  the	  ‘Hearts	  and	  Minds’……………………………………………………………………………………	  	  9	  
3.2	   A	  Unified	  Cause	  ..………………………………………………………………………………………………………...	  10	  
3.3	   Legitimacy	  ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………	  10	  
	  
4	  Methodology	  …………………………………………………………………………………………...……………………………………….	  12	  
	  
5	  A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Ethiopia	  (1974-­‐1991)	  …………………………………………………..……………………………..	  15	  
5.1	   Introduction	  to	  Ethiopia’s	  Civil	  Wars	  and	  Insurgent	  Groups	  ………………………………………..	  15	  
5.2	   Overthrowing	  the	  Regime	  in	  Ethiopia	  ………………………………………………………………………...	  18	  
5.3	   The	  Fight	  for	  Independence	  in	  Eritrea	  ………………………………………………………………………...	  23	  
5.4	   Some	  Concluding	  Comments	  ……………………………………………………………………………..……….	  29	  
	  
6	  A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Somalia	  (c1991-­‐)	  …………………………………………………………………..……………………	  31	  
6.1	   Introduction	  to	  Modern	  Somalia’s	  Political	  Struggles	  .………………………………………………..	  31	  
6.2	   Conclusion	  ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………………	  45	  
	  
7	  A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Liberia	  (1989-­‐2003)	  ………………………………………………………………………..………….	  48	  
7.1	   Introduction	  to	  Governance	  and	  Insurgency	  in	  Liberia	  .………………………………………………	  48	  
7.2	   First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  (1989-­‐1997)	  ……………………………………………………………………………	  49	  
7.3	   The	  Second	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  ………………………………………………………………………………….…	  57	  
7.4	   Concluding	  Comments	  on	  Liberia’s	  Civil	  Wars	  …………………………………………………….………	  60	  
	  
8	  Discussion	  of	  the	  Case	  Studies	  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………....	  61	  
	  
9	  Conclusion	  ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..	  64	  
	  
Bibliography	  …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………	  68	  
	  





Insurgent	  groups	  vary	  in	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  civilians.	  Some	  insurgent	  groups	  perform	  
government	  functions	  to	  further	  their	  political	  objectives	  during	  civil	  war,	  whilst	  other	  rebel	  groups	  use	  
solely	  violent	  means.	  Why	  do	  some	  insurgent	  groups	  perform	  governance	  functions	  to	  further	  their	  political	  
objectives,	  whilst	  others	  interact	  very	  little	  with	  the	  local	  population?	  I	  seek	  to	  explain	  the	  variation	  in	  rebel	  
governance,	  which	  I	  argue	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  insurgency.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  
secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  governance	  structures	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  
insurgent	  groups.	  Using	  an	  in-­‐depth	  case	  study	  analysis,	  I	  found	  varying	  results	  that	  both	  support	  and	  








1   Introduction:	  Governance	  and	  Insurgent	  Groups	  
Insurgent	  and	  rebel	  groups	  have	  often	  been	  characterised	  as	  violent	  warlords,	  particularly	  
those	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  Whilst	  this	  perception	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  some	  rebel	  
actors,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  a	  valid	  term	  for	  various	  contemporary	  insurgencies,	  some	  of	  whom	  control	  
large	  territories	  and	  establish	  extensive	  governmental	  structures	  and	  policies	  to	  rule	  over	  a	  civilian	  
population.	  Studies	  regarding	  the	  brutality	  and	  targeting	  of	  civilians	  by	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  
Revolutionary	  United	  Front	  (RUF)	  in	  Sierra	  Leone	  provide	  a	  horrifying	  portrait	  of	  how	  rebel	  groups	  
can	  behave	  (Kalyvas,	  2006;	  Wood,	  2010).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  Liberation	  Tigers	  of	  
Tamil	  Eelam	  (LTTE)	  in	  northeast	  Sri	  Lanka	  and	  the	  Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF)	  in	  
northern	  Ethiopia	  underline	  how	  some	  insurgencies	  implement	  extensive	  governance	  systems	  in	  
order	  to	  organise	  civilians	  in	  an	  effective	  manner	  for	  a	  political	  purpose	  (Kasfir,	  2015).	  Rebel	  
governance	  is	  a	  political	  strategy	  that	  is	  used	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  military	  strategy	  (Huang,	  2016).	  
Some	  insurgent	  groups	  use	  political	  organisation	  to	  forge	  and	  manage	  relations	  with	  civilians	  during	  
civil	  wars.	  The	  variation	  between	  how	  rebel	  groups	  interact	  with	  civilians	  during	  civil	  war	  raises	  a	  
critical	  question:	  what	  motivates	  how	  rebels	  act	  and	  interact	  with	  civilians	  during	  civil	  war?	  	  
	  
I	  argue	  that	  the	  type	  of	  insurgency	  is	  the	  motivating	  factor	  determining	  whether	  a	  rebel	  group	  
will	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  governance.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  establish	  governance	  systems	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  This	  is	  for	  a	  
number	  of	  reasons:	  first,	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  have	  more	  incentive	  to	  win	  the	  ‘hearts	  and	  
minds’	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups	  (Stubbs,	  1989).	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  
secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  a	  system	  of	  governance,	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  
better	  alternative	  than	  the	  existing	  status	  quo	  (Grynkewich,	  2008).	  Second,	  insurgent	  groups	  
mobilising	  around	  a	  secessionist	  agenda	  are	  incentivised	  to	  develop	  systems	  of	  governance,	  as	  this	  




Querol,	  2005).	  Third,	  insurgent	  groups	  who	  are	  wishing	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  state	  have	  an	  incentive	  
to	  produce	  governance	  structures.	  In	  order	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  sovereign	  
territorial	  unit,	  the	  state	  must	  perform	  certain	  functions,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  governance	  
structures	  and	  basic	  social	  services	  (Kimenyi,	  Mbaku,	  and	  Moyo,	  2010).	  	  
	  
The	  variations	  in	  rebel	  governance	  is	  a	  curious	  one,	  and	  numerous	  competing	  explanations	  
exist,	  including	  the	  presence	  of	  competition,	  out-­‐migration,	  and	  the	  extraction	  of	  resources	  from	  
civilian	  populations	  (Weinstein,	  2007;	  Berman,	  Shapiro,	  and	  Felter,	  2011;	  Steele,	  2017).	  I	  contend	  
that	  the	  existing	  explanations	  do	  not	  sufficiently	  explain	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance.	  Whilst	  they	  
offer	  valuable	  theoretical	  considerations,	  they	  do	  not	  account	  for	  the	  role	  that	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  
insurgency	  plays	  in	  how	  rebels	  act	  during	  civil	  wars	  and	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  civilians.	  	  
	  
	   This	  paper	  will	  proceed	  as	  follows:	  first,	  existing	  explanations	  for	  variations	  in	  rebel	  
governance	  will	  be	  addressed.	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  rebel	  
governance,	  including	  the	  importance	  of	  insurgent	  motivations	  and	  the	  time	  frame	  they	  are	  
operating	  under	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  The	  paper	  will	  go	  on	  to	  
provide	  rich	  case	  study	  analysis	  of	  three	  recent	  or	  ongoing	  civil	  wars:	  Somalia	  (1991-­‐present),	  
Ethiopia	  (1974-­‐1993),	  and	  Liberia	  (1989-­‐2003).	  Whilst	  the	  case	  studies	  produce	  some	  evidence	  that	  
motivations	  and	  time-­‐frames	  are	  important	  determinants	  of	  rebel	  governance	  implementation,	  they	  
raise	  vital	  questions	  for	  future	  research.	  The	  anomalies	  found	  in	  the	  case	  studies,	  for	  example	  al-­‐










2   Existing	  Explanations	  of	  Variations	  in	  Rebel	  Governance	  
Insurgent	  or	  rebel	  governance	  has	  existed	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  domestic	  warfare,	  but	  it	  
has	  not	  gained	  the	  same	  attention	  from	  researchers	  as	  other	  elements	  of	  civil	  war.	  Most	  existing	  
research	  on	  civil	  war	  takes	  the	  structure	  of	  insurgent	  groups	  as	  a	  given	  rather	  than	  trying	  to	  explain	  
it	  (Staniland,	  2014).	  As	  Huang	  (2012)	  argues,	  the	  concept	  of	  rebel	  governance	  stems	  back	  to	  the	  
“revolutionary”	  wars	  of	  the	  twentieth	  centuries,	  featuring	  in	  many	  wars	  of	  independence	  against	  
colonial	  powers.	  The	  writings	  and	  teachings	  of	  Mao	  Zedong,	  Chu	  Guevara,	  and	  Amilcar	  Cabral	  have	  
been	  attributed	  with	  inspiring	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “people’s	  war”,	  in	  which	  rebels	  established	  close	  ties	  
with	  civilians	  through	  political	  organization	  (Huang,	  2012).	  These	  revolutionary	  leaders	  stressed	  that	  
for	  a	  rebel	  group	  to	  succeed,	  they	  must	  establish	  a	  political	  and	  social	  agenda	  that	  coincides	  with	  
their	  military	  strategy	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  Guevara	  (1969)	  described	  the	  guerrilla	  fighter	  as	  a	  “social	  
reformer”,	  emphasising	  that	  combatants	  should	  demonstrate	  an	  element	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  social	  
welfare	  of	  local	  civilians	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  services.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  gain	  support,	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods,	  security,	  and	  the	  guarantee	  of	  public	  
order	  are	  invaluable	  instruments	  (Beckett,	  2001).	  	  Rebel	  governance	  has	  been,	  and	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  
vital	  feature	  of	  insurgent	  warfare.	  Rebel	  governance	  takes	  many	  forms:	  it	  can	  be	  sparse	  or	  elaborate,	  
ineffectual	  or	  highly	  functional.	  Differing	  insurgency	  groups	  offer	  varying	  levels	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  
Some	  form	  highly	  effective	  systems	  of	  governance,	  such	  as	  The	  Liberation	  Tigers	  of	  Tamil	  Eelam	  
(LTTE)	  in	  Sri	  Lanka,	  who	  formed	  an	  elaborate	  centralised	  system	  of	  civilian	  administration	  in	  the	  
territory	  under	  their	  control	  (Mampilly,	  2011;	  Staniland,	  2014).	  Others,	  such	  as	  the	  Congolese	  Rally	  
for	  Democracy	  (RCD)	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  failed	  to	  establish	  a	  system	  of	  
governance	  (Longman,	  2002;	  Kisangi,	  2003;	  Mampilly,	  2011).	  Whilst	  scholars	  such	  as	  Arjona	  (2017),	  
Staniland	  (2016)	  and	  Huang	  (2012)	  offer	  explanations	  for	  the	  variations	  in	  rebel	  governance,	  they	  
overlook	  the	  role	  that	  motivation	  plays	  in	  how	  insurgents	  conduct	  civilian	  relations.	  This	  paper	  




implemented.	  More	  specifically,	  I	  argue	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  
a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgencies.	  I	  aim	  to	  contribute	  to	  an	  emerging	  
literature	  on	  what	  insurgents	  do	  during	  civil	  war	  and	  how	  rebel	  groups	  and	  civilians	  interact.	  
Furthermore,	  I	  aim	  to	  build	  on	  the	  emerging	  rich	  case	  study	  analyses	  of	  insurgent	  groups	  and	  how	  
they	  conduct	  governance	  during	  civil	  wars.	  	  
	  
As	  stated	  above,	  considerable	  variation	  exists	  in	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  insurgent	  governing	  
behaviours.	  Rebel	  governance	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways.	  Some	  rebel	  groups	  engage	  in	  
extensive	  forms	  of	  governance,	  including	  the	  formation	  of	  and	  participation	  in	  political	  institutions	  
and	  providing	  social	  services	  (Huang,	  2012).	  Others	  see	  their	  relations	  with	  civilians	  as	  much	  more	  ad	  
hoc,	  choosing	  to	  interact	  only	  when	  necessary	  (Huang,	  2012).	  The	  first	  argument	  for	  the	  provision	  of	  
governance	  is	  that	  it	  is	  used	  to	  extract	  resources	  from	  the	  civilian	  population,	  ranging	  from	  recruits	  
to	  information,	  financing,	  and	  equipment	  (Berman	  and	  Laitin,	  2008;	  Berman,	  Shapiro	  and	  Felter,	  
2011;	  Salehyan,	  Siroky,	  and	  Wood,	  2014).	  Berman	  and	  Laitin	  (2008)	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  particularly	  the	  
case	  in	  areas	  were	  the	  provision	  of	  public	  goods	  by	  the	  government	  is	  weak.	  In	  response,	  rebel	  
groups	  provide	  the	  missing	  public	  goods,	  and	  use	  this	  to	  recruit	  committed	  civilians	  who	  are	  willing	  
to	  commit	  acts	  of	  violence	  for	  their	  cause	  (Weinstein,	  2007;	  Berman	  and	  Laitin,	  2008).	  An	  example	  
of	  this	  is	  Hamas,	  who	  provide	  social	  and	  welfare	  services	  within	  Palestine	  and	  has	  used	  this	  to	  recruit	  
members	  who	  are	  willing	  to	  conduct	  deadly	  violence,	  including	  a	  high	  proportion	  of	  suicide	  bombers	  
(Berman	  and	  Laitin,	  2008).	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  extraction	  of	  resources	  from	  civilians	  does	  not	  fully	  
explain	  variation	  within	  rebel	  governance,	  as	  some	  insurgencies	  do	  not	  require	  governance	  
structures	  to	  produce	  recruits	  from	  the	  civilian	  population.	  Recruitment	  can	  occur	  for	  a	  number	  of	  
reasons	  including	  opportunity	  cost,	  fear,	  the	  threat	  of	  violence,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  
civilians	  (Wood,	  2010;	  Holtermann,	  2016).	  The	  opportunity	  cost	  argument	  infers	  that	  civilians	  take	  
into	  account	  the	  cost	  of	  rebellion	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  victory	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  1998;	  2004).	  If	  




among	  civilians	  is	  more	  likely	  (Collier	  and	  Hoeffler,	  1998).	  Additionally,	  the	  extraction	  argument	  is	  
flawed	  to	  the	  abundance	  of	  vulnerable	  people,	  particularly	  children,	  who	  are	  often	  victims	  of	  
forcible	  recruitment	  during	  civil	  wars	  (Hart,	  2006).	  	  
	  
A	  second	  argument	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  governance	  structures	  by	  rebel	  organisations	  is	  
to	  gain	  economic	  resources	  from	  the	  civilian	  population.	  Weinstein	  (2007)	  argues	  that	  insurgencies	  
use	  elements	  of	  governance,	  such	  as	  the	  provision	  of	  social	  services,	  to	  attract	  economic	  resources	  
from	  within	  the	  population.	  Rebel	  governance	  often	  includes	  a	  system	  of	  civilian	  taxation,	  which	  can	  
either	  be	  extorted	  from	  civilians	  or	  given	  voluntarily	  (Weinstein,	  2007;	  Sabates-­‐Wheeler	  and	  
Verwimp,	  2014).	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  extraction	  of	  economic	  resources	  from	  civilians	  is	  not	  sufficient	  in	  
explaining	  why	  rebel	  governance	  occurs,	  as	  rebel	  groups	  are	  able	  to	  pull	  resources	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  
other	  sources.	  Insurgent	  groups	  can	  enjoy	  economic	  support	  from	  foreign	  actors,	  natural	  resource	  
rents,	  or	  remittances	  from	  abroad	  (Lujula,	  2010;	  Huang,	  2016).	  The	  extraction	  argument	  depends	  on	  
the	  relative	  cost	  of	  services	  versus	  the	  value	  of	  the	  extracted	  resources.	  As	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  
is	  costly	  and	  employs	  a	  large	  volume	  of	  resources,	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  argument	  arises	  in	  regards	  
to	  the	  extraction	  of	  economic	  resources.	  If	  the	  services	  provided	  by	  an	  insurgent	  group	  exceed	  the	  
amount	  of	  resources	  they	  are	  able	  to	  extract	  from	  the	  civilians,	  they	  would	  be	  left	  with	  a	  net	  loss	  of	  
resources,	  thus	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  would	  be	  counterproductive.	  The	  extraction	  argument	  thus	  
only	  holds	  if	  rebels	  are	  able	  to	  extract	  the	  amount	  of	  necessary	  resources	  for	  providing	  services	  
(Hegre,	  2004).	  This	  is	  often	  not	  the	  case,	  particularly	  when	  fighting	  an	  insurgency	  against	  resource-­‐
rich	  states	  who	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  utilise	  state	  resources	  to	  fund	  their	  counter-­‐insurgency	  (Collier	  
and	  Hoeffler,	  2004).	  
	  
A	  third	  explanation	  for	  implementing	  rebel	  governance	  is	  to	  prevent	  civilians	  fleeing,	  as	  they	  
more	  commonly	  would	  under	  the	  threat	  of	  violence	  (Engel	  and	  Ibáñez,	  2007;	  Ibáñez	  and	  Vélez,	  




populations	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons,	  including	  for	  resources,	  recruits,	  information,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  
maintain	  a	  level	  of	  protective	  cover	  from	  rivals	  (Stewart,	  2017).	  I	  argue	  that	  this	  does	  not	  sufficiently	  
explain	  the	  variations	  in	  rebel	  governance,	  as	  the	  use	  or	  threat	  of	  violence	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  the	  
civilians’	  decision	  to	  leave	  or	  remain	  in	  a	  community.	  Rebel	  groups	  may	  occupy	  peacefully,	  or	  they	  
may	  target	  civilians	  selectively,	  indiscriminately,	  or	  collectively,	  each	  prompting	  a	  different	  reaction	  
and	  creating	  different	  volumes	  of	  displacement	  and	  out-­‐migration	  (Steele,	  2017).	  The	  threat	  of	  
violence	  at	  the	  individual	  or	  household	  level,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  presence	  of	  paramilitary	  and	  guerrilla	  
groups,	  is	  strongly	  associated	  with	  out-­‐migration	  (Engel	  and	  Ibáñez,	  2007;	  Ibáñez	  and	  Vélez,	  2008;	  
Alvarado	  and	  Massey,	  2010).	  The	  out-­‐migration	  argument,	  therefore,	  does	  not	  fully	  explain	  the	  
variation	  in	  rebel	  governance,	  as	  other	  factors,	  primarily	  the	  use	  of	  violence,	  influence	  whether	  
civilians	  remain	  within	  a	  territory.	  
	  
	   The	  final	  argument	  concerns	  civil	  wars	  where	  numerous	  factions	  are	  fighting.	  In	  this	  
instance,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  insurgent	  groups	  have	  to	  find	  methods	  to	  gain	  public	  support	  away	  from	  
their	  competitors	  (Bloom,	  2004).	  In	  order	  to	  persuade	  civilians	  to	  mobilise	  behind	  the	  cause,	  rebel	  
groups	  often	  implement	  structures	  that	  replicate	  the	  state	  in	  order	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  coherent	  and	  
capable	  alternative	  (Bueno	  de	  Mesquita,	  2010).	  This	  often	  occurs	  when	  competition	  exists	  between	  
rival	  insurgent	  groups	  or	  between	  a	  nonstate	  actor	  and	  the	  state.	  Grynkewich	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  a	  
terrorist	  or	  guerrilla	  organisation	  providing	  social	  services	  to	  the	  local	  populace	  can	  threaten	  the	  
social	  contract	  between	  the	  population	  and	  the	  state,	  undermining	  a	  key	  source	  of	  state	  legitimacy.	  
This	  can	  also	  occur	  between	  a	  number	  of	  competing	  insurgent	  factions	  within	  a	  civil	  war.	  By	  
implementing	  a	  system	  of	  governance,	  a	  rebel	  group	  can	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  a	  more	  credible	  
alternative	  to	  either	  the	  existing	  state	  government	  or	  to	  other	  competing	  insurgent	  groups	  (Bloom,	  
2004;	  Grynkewich,	  2008).	  Civilians	  may	  decide	  who	  they	  grant	  their	  loyalty	  to	  based	  on	  the	  provision	  
of	  governance	  by	  various	  actors	  in	  a	  civil	  war.	  Whilst	  the	  presence	  of	  competing	  insurgent	  groups	  




explaining	  why	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance	  exists.	  There	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  
competition	  will	  lead	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  violent	  targeting	  of	  civilians	  (Chenoweth,	  2010;	  Wood,	  
2010;	  Nemeth,	  2013).	  Violence	  against	  civilians	  can	  occur	  either	  as	  a	  result	  of	  direct	  targeting	  or	  
collateral	  damage,	  particularly	  in	  the	  instance	  that	  a	  new	  rival	  faction	  emerges	  (Kathman,	  2015).	  	  	  
	  
	   There	  are	  existing	  explanations	  for	  how	  the	  strategic	  objective	  and	  motivation	  of	  an	  
insurgent	  group	  affects	  their	  desire	  to	  address	  civilian	  needs	  and	  implement	  rebel	  governance.	  
Literature	  regarding	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  insurgent	  group	  focus	  on	  two	  mechanisms:	  the	  “strategic	  
objective”	  mechanism	  and	  the	  “insurgent	  promises”	  mechanism	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  The	  “strategic	  
objective”	  mechanism	  argues	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  power-­‐seeking	  insurgent	  groups	  believe	  that	  
diverting	  resources	  away	  from	  the	  military	  objective	  towards	  civilian	  governance	  is	  
counterproductive	  to	  their	  power-­‐seeking	  objective	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  leaders	  of	  
secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  will	  move	  beyond	  the	  military	  objective	  and	  devote	  resources	  to	  
portraying	  itself	  as	  the	  “national”	  government	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  The	  “insurgent	  promises”	  
mechanism	  argues	  that	  central	  power-­‐seeking	  insurgent	  groups	  make	  promises	  to	  improve	  
conditions	  for	  the	  local	  populace	  only	  after	  the	  organisation	  has	  taken	  power	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  
Whilst	  the	  two	  mechanisms	  are	  a	  valid	  starting	  point	  for	  developing	  a	  theory	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  it	  
does	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  explaining	  why	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  implementation	  of	  
governance	  structures.	  	  
	  
Existing	  explanations	  of	  rebel	  governance	  fail	  to	  properly	  address	  the	  variation	  in	  rebel	  
governance	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  as	  they	  do	  not	  go	  deep	  enough	  in	  to	  why	  secessionist	  
insurgent	  groups	  implement	  rebel	  governance.	  Political	  scientists	  such	  as	  Grynkewich	  (2008),	  Wood	  
(2010),	  and	  Huang	  (2012)	  have	  accounted	  for	  a	  number	  of	  scenarios	  in	  civil	  war	  governance,	  
however	  I	  contend	  rebel	  groups	  with	  secessionist	  goals	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  




motivated	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons:	  the	  need	  to	  win	  the	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  of	  the	  civilian	  population,	  
the	  desire	  to	  form	  a	  unified	  cause	  to	  gain	  widespread	  support,	  and	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  
legitimacy	  from	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors.	  Whilst	  literature	  has	  begun	  to	  explain	  
secessionist	  insurgencies	  and	  rebel	  governance,	  they	  do	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  explaining	  why	  






















3   Theory:	  The	  Determinants	  of	  Variation	  in	  Rebel	  Governance	  	  
Insurgent	  groups	  emerge	  from	  differing	  prewar	  social	  bases,	  leading	  to	  a	  multitude	  of	  different	  
types	  of	  organisations	  (Staniland,	  2014).	  Some	  groups	  provide	  extensive	  governance	  structures	  to	  all	  
civilians	  living	  under	  their	  territorial	  control	  and	  others	  provide	  no	  governance	  at	  all.	  The	  type	  of	  
relationship	  a	  rebel	  organisation	  builds	  with	  the	  civilian	  population	  residing	  in	  the	  territory	  under	  
their	  control	  is	  a	  strategic	  choice	  made	  under	  a	  number	  of	  political,	  economic,	  ideological,	  and	  social	  
considerations	  (Huang,	  2012).	  This	  section	  will	  address	  why	  the	  motivation	  of	  the	  insurgency	  is	  a	  key	  
determinant	  in	  explaining	  why	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance	  exists.	  More	  specifically,	  this	  section	  
will	  argue	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance	  
than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgencies.	  	  
	  
3.1   Winning	  the	  ‘Hearts	  and	  Minds’	  	  
	   Garnering	  true	  public	  support	  is	  a	  vital	  element	  in	  secessionist	  insurgencies.	  Firstly,	  
secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  target	  the	  civilians	  living	  under	  their	  territorial	  control	  
than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgencies	  (Fortna,	  2013;	  Keller,	  2013).	  Secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  often	  
have	  less	  military	  capability	  than	  the	  state	  they	  are	  fighting	  against,	  therefore	  violence	  against	  
civilians	  can	  be	  counterproductive	  due	  to	  the	  increased	  need	  to	  gain	  resources,	  support,	  and	  recruits	  
from	  the	  local	  population	  (Cunningham,	  Gleditsch,	  and	  Salehyan,	  2009).	  Secessionist	  insurgencies,	  
therefore,	  often	  need	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  they	  can	  win	  the	  loyalty	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  
(Grynkewich,	  2008).	  One	  way	  they	  do	  this	  is	  by	  providing	  governance	  to	  those	  within	  their	  territorial	  
control,	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  better	  alternative	  than	  the	  existing	  status	  quo	  (Grynkewich,	  2008).	  Both	  
civilians	  and	  insurgents	  benefit	  from	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  governance	  structure;	  the	  civilians	  
stand	  to	  gain	  potential	  stability	  and	  order,	  as	  well	  as	  necessary	  services	  such	  as	  education	  and	  
health,	  and	  the	  insurgents	  can	  utilise	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  civilian	  population	  that	  is	  now	  loyal	  to	  





3.2   A	  Unified	  Cause	  
More	  often	  than	  not,	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  formed	  along	  ethnic	  lines	  (Fazal,	  2014).	  
Secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  often	  a	  legacy	  of	  geographical	  borders	  that	  were	  imposed	  on	  the	  
nation	  by	  colonial	  powers,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  maltreatment	  by	  by	  former	  colonial	  powers,	  the	  exclusion	  
of	  an	  ethnic	  group	  in	  political	  or	  economic	  opportunities,	  or	  the	  denial	  of	  rights	  (Muller,	  2008;	  
Mampilly,	  2011).	  Secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  often	  use	  their	  shared	  experience	  and	  identity	  to	  
create	  emotive	  powers	  from	  the	  idea	  that	  members	  of	  an	  ethnic	  group	  are	  united	  around	  the	  notion	  
of	  “us	  versus	  them”	  (Muller,	  2008).	  Secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  a	  
system	  of	  governance	  and	  service	  provision	  for	  those	  who	  share	  their	  history,	  culture,	  and	  language.	  
The	  Liberation	  Tigers	  of	  Tamil	  Eelam	  (LTTE)	  in	  Sri	  Lanka	  are	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this;	  the	  LTTE	  claimed	  
a	  mandate	  to	  represent	  the	  Tamil	  people,	  and	  subsequently	  developed	  a	  governance	  structure	  in	  
accordance	  with	  their	  desire	  to	  create	  and	  rule	  their	  own	  independent	  Tamil	  state	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  
Secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  not	  guaranteed	  the	  support	  of	  their	  own	  ethnic	  kin;	  thus	  systems	  of	  
governance	  are	  often	  used	  in	  order	  to	  convince	  them	  that	  the	  benefits	  of	  supporting	  the	  insurgency	  
outweigh	  the	  potential	  risks	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  To	  sum,	  Secessionist	  insurgencies	  have	  a	  vested	  
interest	  in	  providing	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  areas	  under	  their	  territorial	  control,	  in	  order	  to	  earn	  
mass	  support	  from	  the	  civilian	  population.	  	  
	  
3.3   Legitimacy	  	  
	   Seeking	  legitimacy	  and	  recognition	  by	  international	  actors	  is	  often	  a	  primary	  goal	  of	  
secessionist	  insurgencies	  (Fazal,	  2014).	  To	  be	  recognised	  as	  a	  sovereign	  territorial	  unit,	  the	  state	  
must	  perform	  certain	  functions,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  security,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  basic	  social	  
services,	  and	  political	  services	  (Kimenyi,	  Mbaku,	  and	  Moyo,	  2010).	  In	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  credible	  
alternative	  to	  the	  nation	  state	  on	  the	  international	  state,	  an	  insurgent	  group	  needs	  to	  replicate	  some	  




people	  living	  within	  the	  territory	  they	  wish	  to	  become	  independent,	  not	  just	  those	  who	  belong	  to	  
the	  same	  ethnic	  group	  as	  the	  insurgents.	  Implementing	  an	  effective	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance	  
during	  the	  insurgency	  is	  a	  vital	  step	  for	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  
legitimacy.	  Not	  only	  does	  it	  show	  the	  international	  community	  that	  the	  rebels	  care	  about	  the	  
civilians	  living	  within	  their	  territorial	  control,	  but	  it	  also	  signifies	  that	  the	  rebels	  are	  capable	  of	  
running	  an	  independent	  sovereign	  state	  (Wimmer,	  2012).	  Secessionist	  insurgents	  cannot	  rely	  on	  
military	  power	  alone	  to	  pursue	  their	  goal	  of	  independence	  from	  the	  existing	  government	  structures	  
and	  borders,	  therefore	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  and	  service	  provision	  is	  an	  effective	  
strategy	  through	  which	  they	  can	  gain	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  legitimacy.	  	  
	  
	   Insurgencies	  that	  need	  to	  gather	  and	  maintain	  wide	  civilian	  support	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
provide	  governance	  and	  services	  to	  the	  local	  populace.	  This	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  among	  
secessionist	  insurgencies	  who	  are	  incentivised	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  the	  population,	  
and	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy	  from	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  actors.	  
Furthermore,	  insurgencies	  with	  future	  goals,	  as	  opposed	  to	  short-­‐term	  present	  goals,	  are	  more	  
inclined	  to	  establish	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  as	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  method	  of	  gaining	  resources,	  
information,	  income,	  and	  recruits	  (Arjona,	  2016).	  The	  testable	  hypothesis	  that	  has	  developed	  from	  
the	  theory	  is	  as	  follows:	  
	  
H1:	  Insurgent	  groups	  who	  wish	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  state	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  governance	  and	  
services	  than	  those	  who	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  state.	  	  
	  
Having	  explored	  the	  existing	  literature	  and	  outlining	  the	  theory	  regarding	  variation	  in	  rebel	  
governance,	  the	  next	  section	  will	  outline	  the	  methodology	  which	  will	  be	  employed	  throughout	  the	  




4   Methodology	  
	   As	  has	  been	  discussed,	  there	  is	  less	  literature	  on	  rebel	  governance	  than	  one	  would	  expect	  
(Huang,	  2012).	  Whilst	  useful	  theories	  and	  narratives	  exist,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  specific	  examples	  
to	  assess	  the	  broader	  question	  of	  why	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance	  exists.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  an	  in-­‐
depth	  case	  study	  approach	  has	  been	  adopted	  which	  builds	  on	  and	  enhances	  the	  current	  literature.	  
Case	  study	  analysis	  has	  the	  benefit	  of	  providing	  both	  explanatory	  and	  exploratory	  power,	  and	  are	  a	  
useful	  tool	  in	  understanding	  “complex	  social	  phenomena”	  (Yin,	  1994).	  Whilst	  statistical	  analyses	  of	  
large	  data	  sets	  can	  point	  to	  a	  correlation	  between	  two	  variables,	  it	  says	  little	  about	  why	  this	  effect	  
occurs	  (Mampilly,	  2011).	  By	  using	  a	  case	  study	  analysis,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  trace	  operational	  relationships	  
between	  events	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  why	  rebel	  groups	  acted	  a	  certain	  way.	  The	  case	  studies	  
underlined	  local	  and	  national	  dynamics	  and	  provided	  insight	  into	  the	  specific	  factors	  that	  shaped	  the	  
observed	  outcome.	  The	  broad	  historical	  scope,	  including	  the	  background	  and	  history	  of	  each	  case	  
study,	  allowed	  me	  to	  navigate	  how	  governance	  had	  evolved	  in	  each	  instance.	  
	  
My	  primary	  concern	  was	  to	  select	  cases	  as	  randomly	  as	  possible,	  in	  order	  to	  have	  no	  
preconceptions	  about	  the	  insurgents	  and	  their	  motivations.	  Case	  study	  selection	  can	  be	  biased	  or	  
altered	  to	  make	  specific	  points,	  so	  by	  randomly	  selecting	  my	  cases	  I	  endeavored	  to	  avoid	  this	  as	  far	  
as	  possible	  (Yin,	  1994).	  In	  order	  to	  randomly	  select	  three	  civil	  war	  instances,	  I	  used	  the	  PRIO	  Battle	  
Deaths	  Dataset	  and	  a	  random	  number	  generator	  to	  select	  the	  three	  cases	  of	  Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  
Liberia.	  I	  used	  the	  PRIO	  Battle	  Deaths	  Data	  as	  it	  is	  a	  comprehensive	  dataset	  that	  covers	  all	  state-­‐
based	  armed	  conflicts	  in	  the	  period	  1946-­‐2008.	  Furthermore,	  the	  Battle	  Deaths	  dataset	  covers	  
combatant	  and	  civilian	  deaths,	  thus	  differentiating	  between	  civil	  armed	  conflicts	  and	  one-­‐sided	  
violence	  (Lacina	  and	  Gleditsch,	  2005).	  Whilst	  the	  cases	  may	  appear	  limited,	  due	  to	  their	  geographical	  
location	  in	  the	  same	  region,	  this	  is	  unsurprising	  due	  to	  the	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  civil	  wars	  in	  
Africa	  (Elbadwai	  and	  Sambanis,	  2000).	  Additionally,	  the	  cases	  provide	  a	  natural	  control	  as	  all	  of	  the	  




analysis,	  therefore,	  allows	  me	  to	  control	  for	  country-­‐level	  variables,	  such	  as	  poverty	  levels,	  
education	  levels,	  and	  geographic	  climate.	  This	  enables	  increased	  reliability	  in	  determining	  what	  
factor	  influences	  the	  implementation	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  as	  all	  of	  the	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  
operating	  in	  the	  same	  political,	  economic,	  social,	  and	  geographic	  climate.	  I	  believe	  the	  three	  case	  
studies	  offer	  important	  insight	  into	  the	  way	  insurgent	  groups	  conduct	  themselves	  in	  civil	  war,	  as	  
they	  portray	  the	  complexity	  of	  rebel	  governance	  and	  enable	  me	  to	  demonstrate	  either	  the	  
uniqueness	  of	  or	  the	  commonalities	  between	  insurgent	  groups	  (Stake,	  1995).	  As	  will	  be	  shown	  
throughout	  the	  case	  study	  analysis,	  numerous	  insurgent	  groups	  contradicted	  expected	  trends	  in	  
rebel	  governance.	  This	  is	  important	  as	  it	  enables	  new	  theories	  to	  be	  produced,	  particularly	  in	  regards	  
to	  rebel	  groups	  who	  do	  not	  act	  in	  the	  way	  that	  would	  be	  expected	  from	  existing	  theories.	  	  	  
	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  limitations	  in	  the	  random	  case	  study	  selection	  is	  that	  I	  was	  unable	  to	  
determine	  the	  availability	  of	  sources	  prior	  to	  my	  research.	  Additionally,	  as	  it	  was	  not	  possible	  for	  me	  
to	  conduct	  fieldwork	  myself,	  I	  was	  reliant	  on	  secondary	  sources	  and	  I	  was	  only	  able	  to	  draw	  on	  
readily	  available	  information.	  The	  difficulties	  in	  conducting	  fieldwork	  in	  conflict	  zones	  meant	  that	  
there	  are,	  in	  some	  cases,	  a	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  a	  small	  number	  of	  sources.	  I	  countered	  this	  as	  best	  as	  
possible	  to	  cross-­‐check	  the	  information	  by	  broadening	  my	  scope	  to	  look	  at	  news	  reports,	  
ethnographic	  fieldwork	  and	  interviews	  from	  the	  conflict	  zones	  where	  available,	  historical	  sources,	  
and	  sources	  from	  within	  the	  social	  sciences.	  Furthermore,	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  bias	  from	  scholars,	  I	  
utilized	  sources	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  people,	  including	  Western	  scholars,	  scholars	  from	  the	  conflict	  
zones,	  reports	  from	  international	  organisations,	  and,	  where	  available,	  interviews	  with	  combatants	  
and	  non-­‐combatants	  from	  the	  civil	  wars	  in	  question.	  	  
	  
The	  following	  sections	  look	  at	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  three	  civil	  wars:	  Ethiopia	  (1962-­‐1991),	  
Liberia	  (1989-­‐2003),	  and	  Somalia	  (1991-­‐).	  I	  tested	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  




determine	  the	  motive	  of	  each	  insurgency,	  a	  brief	  historical	  context	  will	  be	  provided.	  From	  this,	  how	  
the	  rebels	  conducted	  themselves	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  will	  be	  analysed,	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  
produced	  systems	  of	  governance.	  I	  will	  then	  draw	  conclusions	  and	  propose	  new	  hypotheses	  as	  to	  




















5   A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Ethiopia	  (1974-­‐1991)	  
5.1   	  Introduction	  to	  Ethiopia’s	  Civil	  Wars	  and	  Insurgent	  Groups	  
The	  simultaneous	  political	  struggles	  that	  emerged	  in	  Ethiopia	  –	  the	  Eritrean	  war	  of	  
independence	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Derg	  regime	  -­‐	  provide	  a	  previously	  unexplored	  case	  study	  
into	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance.	  This	  case	  study,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  methodology	  section,	  was	  
chosen	  at	  random,	  but	  by	  exploring	  the	  civil-­‐war	  history	  of	  modern	  Ethiopia	  this	  case	  study	  brings	  to	  
light	  how	  rebel	  groups	  with	  different	  motivations	  came	  to	  mirror	  each	  other.	  This	  case	  study	  will	  be	  
evaluated	  in	  relation	  to	  what	  extent	  this	  example	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  set	  out	  in	  Section	  3	  of	  this	  
paper.	  
	  
Throughout	  the	  Eritrean	  struggle	  for	  independence	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Ethiopian	  
regime,	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  were	  established	  by	  a	  number	  of	  insurgent	  groups.	  Rebel	  
interaction	  with	  civilians	  in	  Ethiopia	  was	  systematic	  and	  sustained,	  and	  it	  was	  often	  used	  as	  a	  
method	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  the	  masses,	  as	  well	  as	  gaining	  legitimacy	  and	  recognition	  (Huang,	  
2012).	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  discuss	  the	  simultaneous	  insurgencies	  occurring	  in	  Ethiopia:	  one	  to	  
overthrow	  the	  regime	  in	  Ethiopia,	  and	  the	  other	  fighting	  for	  secession	  and	  independence	  of	  Eritrea.	  
The	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  Eritrea,	  the	  Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF)	  and	  the	  Eritrean	  People’s	  
Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF),	  had	  secessionist	  motivations,	  thus	  in	  relation	  to	  my	  theory	  and	  hypothesis,	  it	  
is	  expected	  that	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  would	  emerge.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  insurgent	  
groups	  in	  Ethiopia,	  the	  Tigray	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (TPLF)	  and	  the	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  
Revolutionary	  Party	  (EPRP),	  had	  non-­‐secessionist	  motivations,	  therefore	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  they	  
would	  not	  develop	  systems	  of	  governance.	  Table	  1	  presents	  the	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  will	  be	  





Table	  1:	  Ethiopian	  Rebel	  Groups	  in	  Order	  of	  Discussion	  
Insurgent	  Group	   Secessionist?	   Expected	  rebel	  
governance?	  
Evidence	  of	  rebel	  
governance?	  
TPLF	   No	   No	   Yes	  
EPRP	   No	   No	   No	  
ELF	   Yes	   Yes	   No	  
EPLF	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
	  
	  
This	  section	  will	  consider	  the	  civil	  war	  period	  from	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  the	  Derg	  regime	  to	  
power	  and	  the	  two	  simultaneous	  civil	  wars	  fought	  in	  Ethiopia:	  the	  war	  of	  independence	  in	  Eritrea	  
and	  the	  conflict	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Derg	  regime	  in	  Ethiopia.	  Whilst	  the	  war	  of	  independence	  in	  Eritrea	  
began	  in	  1962,	  following	  the	  unilateral	  annexation	  of	  Eritrea	  by	  Emperor	  Haile-­‐Sellassie	  which	  
conflicted	  with	  a	  UN	  agreement	  to	  create	  the	  federation	  of	  Eritrea,	  this	  section	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  
post-­‐1974	  period	  following	  the	  Derg’s	  ascension	  to	  power.	  The	  conflict	  in	  Eritrea	  began	  with	  the	  
Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF)	  who	  started	  an	  insurgency	  in	  the	  region	  to	  regain	  their	  independence.	  
As	  this	  case	  study	  will	  show,	  they	  started	  the	  civil	  war	  but	  were	  unsuccessful	  in	  their	  programme.	  
The	  eventual	  victors	  of	  the	  war	  were	  the	  Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF),	  an	  off-­‐shoot	  
branch	  of	  ELF.	  As	  will	  be	  shown,	  by	  working	  in	  tandem	  with	  Ethiopian	  resistance	  movements,	  
Eritrean	  insurgents	  were	  effective	  in	  mobilising	  the	  Eritrean	  citizens,	  both	  peasants	  and	  intellectuals	  
alike	  (Paul	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  successfully	  managed	  to	  create	  a	  combined	  military	  and	  
political	  campaign	  that	  would	  end	  the	  brutal,	  authoritarian,	  nominally-­‐Marxist,	  combined	  armed-­‐
forces	  regime,	  known	  as	  the	  Derg	  regime,	  and	  re-­‐establish	  the	  independent	  Eritrean	  state	  (Pool,	  
2001).	  The	  success	  of	  the	  EPLF	  can	  be	  credited	  to	  the	  extensive	  system	  of	  governance	  they	  




to	  reducing	  dependency	  through	  self-­‐reliance	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  local	  administrations,	  
education	  systems,	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  care	  (Connell,	  2001;	  Pool,	  2001).	  	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  ELF	  and	  the	  EPLF	  fought	  for	  the	  independence	  of	  Eritrea,	  a	  separate	  protest	  
movement	  emerged	  in	  Ethiopia.	  The	  Derg	  regime	  had	  ascended	  to	  power	  following	  the	  overthrow	  of	  
Emperor	  Haile-­‐Sellassie,	  declaring	  “Ethiopia	  Tikidam”	  (Ethiopia	  First),	  before	  asserting	  itself	  as	  a	  
socialist	  government	  committed	  to	  effecting	  social	  change	  and	  promoting	  development	  and	  social	  
justice	  (Tuso,	  1997).	  In	  reality,	  however,	  the	  Derg	  regime	  emerged	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  brutal	  regimes	  
in	  the	  world	  with	  little	  regard	  for	  human	  rights	  (Tuso,	  1997;	  Young,	  1998).	  With	  little	  genuine	  
progression	  or	  conviction	  within	  the	  regime’s	  policies,	  the	  Derg	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  the	  promise	  that	  
they	  would	  produce	  change	  and	  offer	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  previous	  regime	  of	  Haile-­‐Selassie	  (Young,	  
1998).	  1977-­‐1978	  saw	  the	  instigation	  of	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  the	  Ethiopian	  Red	  Terror,	  in	  
which	  saw	  competing	  groups	  partake	  in	  a	  violent	  political	  campaign	  that	  led	  to	  the	  deaths	  of	  an	  
estimated	  750,000	  people	  (Harff	  and	  Gurr,	  1988).	  From	  the	  initiation	  of	  the	  Ethiopian	  civil	  war	  in	  
1974	  until	  the	  defeat	  and	  overthrow	  of	  the	  regime	  in	  1991,	  the	  Derg	  fought	  a	  number	  of	  rebel	  
groups.	  At	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  struggle	  was	  those	  fighting	  for	  Eritrean	  independence,	  predominantly	  
the	  Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF)	  and	  later	  the	  Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF),	  and	  those	  
fighting	  to	  overthrow	  the	  regime	  in	  Ethiopia	  proper,	  namely	  the	  Tigrayan	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  
(TPLF)	  and	  later	  the	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Democratic	  Front	  (EPRDF).	  	  
	  
The	  following	  sections	  will	  discuss	  and	  evaluate	  the	  simultaneous	  insurgencies	  occurring	  in	  
Ethiopia:	  some	  fighting	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Derg	  regime	  in	  Ethiopia	  and	  the	  other	  fighting	  for	  secession	  
and	  independence	  of	  Eritrea	  from	  the	  Ethiopian	  powers.	  Ethiopia	  provides	  a	  complex	  case	  study	  as	  
there	  were	  multiple	  civil	  wars	  happening	  simultaneously.	  Throughout	  the	  Eritrean	  struggle	  for	  
independence	  and	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Ethiopian	  regime,	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  were	  




systematic	  and	  sustained,	  and	  it	  was	  often	  used	  as	  a	  method	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  the	  masses,	  as	  
well	  as	  gaining	  legitimacy	  and	  recognition	  (Huang,	  2012).	  The	  complexity	  of	  the	  different	  groups	  all	  
operating	  at	  the	  same	  time	  in	  the	  same	  country	  provides	  a	  myriad	  of	  evidence	  for	  how	  civil	  war	  
governance	  emerges	  and	  why.	  It	  will	  become	  clear	  by	  looking	  at	  some	  of	  the	  prevalent	  civil	  war	  
groups	  that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  distil	  actions	  of	  governance	  to	  simple	  causes.	  It	  will	  also	  become	  
clear	  that	  the	  motivations	  and	  intended	  plans	  of	  the	  insurgent	  groups	  do	  not	  necessarily	  correspond	  
to	  the	  expected	  level	  of	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
5.2   	  Overthrowing	  the	  Regime	  in	  Ethiopia	  	  	  
	   The	  overthrow	  of	  the	  imperial	  government	  of	  Haile-­‐Selassie	  and	  the	  replacement	  of	  the	  
government	  with	  a	  brutal	  military	  regime,	  the	  Derg,	  in	  1974	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  tumultuous	  
period	  in	  Ethiopia	  (Young,	  1998).	  The	  anti-­‐monarchy	  revolutionaries	  who	  had	  overthrown	  Emperor	  
Haile-­‐Selassie	  ran	  a	  ruthless	  regime,	  encouraging	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  number	  of	  insurgent	  groups	  
and	  marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  lengthy	  civil	  war	  that	  would	  leave	  an	  estimated	  150,000	  civilians	  
dead	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  violence	  committed	  against	  civilians	  (Anon.,	  1991).	  The	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  
Revolutionary	  Party	  (EPRP)	  emerged	  as	  a	  contender	  to	  the	  Derg	  regime	  predominantly	  in	  the	  capital,	  
Addis	  Ababa,	  and	  other	  urban	  areas.	  Whilst	  they	  would	  come	  to	  be	  defeated	  by	  1977,	  they	  played	  
an	  important	  role	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  civil	  war,	  unleashing	  violence	  against	  the	  Derg	  regime	  in	  
an	  attempt	  to	  overthrow	  them.	  Similarly,	  the	  people	  of	  Tigray	  were	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  rural	  
movement	  against	  the	  Derg;	  both	  the	  Tigrayan	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (TPLF)	  and	  the	  Ethiopian	  
People’s	  Revolutionary	  Democratic	  Front	  (EPRDF),	  the	  group	  that	  would	  come	  to	  overthrow	  the	  
Derg	  regime	  in	  Ethiopia,	  were	  established	  and	  managed	  by	  student	  revolutionaries	  from	  Tigray	  
(Tuso,	  1997).	  The	  following	  sections	  will	  discuss	  the	  tactics	  used	  by	  the	  EPRP	  and	  the	  TPLF	  
throughout	  their	  bids	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Derg	  regime,	  with	  a	  view	  to	  analyse	  whether	  the	  non-­‐





5.2.1   Tigrayan	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  
	   The	  TPLF	  emerged	  from	  the	  Ethiopian	  student	  movement	  who	  had	  successfully	  overthrown	  
the	  long-­‐prevailing	  regime	  of	  Haile-­‐Selassie.	  Initially	  spearheaded	  by	  a	  political	  elite	  of	  students	  and	  
teachers,	  the	  movement	  was	  successful	  in	  gaining	  widespread	  regional	  support	  for	  their	  anti-­‐Derg	  
insurgency	  (Segers	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Throughout	  the	  years	  of	  civil	  war,	  the	  TPLF	  came	  to	  represent	  the	  
centre	  of	  popular	  resistance	  against	  the	  Derg	  in	  Tigray	  (Segers	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Created	  by	  seven	  
students	  in	  Addis	  Ababa,	  the	  group’s	  membership	  was	  initially	  very	  small	  and	  in	  its	  early	  years	  it	  
experienced	  significant	  difficulties	  recruiting	  from	  Tigray’s	  predominantly	  rural	  population	  (Wood,	  
2010).	  The	  repression	  of	  the	  Derg	  alone	  was	  not	  enough	  to	  persuade	  the	  sceptical	  peasantry	  to	  join	  
the	  insurgency.	  By	  the	  early	  1980s,	  however,	  the	  group’s	  recruitment	  had	  increased	  five-­‐fold	  (Wood,	  
2010).	  The	  significant	  rise	  in	  recruitment	  has	  been	  credited	  to	  the	  TPLF’s	  ability	  to	  convince	  the	  rural	  
peasantry	  that	  the	  insurgency	  not	  only	  possessed	  the	  military	  capacity	  to	  defeat	  the	  Derg,	  but	  also	  
that	  TPLF	  had	  the	  political	  capacity	  to	  provide	  services	  and	  institutions	  in	  the	  areas	  it	  controlled	  
(Wood,	  2010).	  The	  governance	  structures	  suggested	  and	  provided	  by	  the	  TPLF,	  therefore,	  fostered	  a	  
strong	  mutual	  support	  between	  the	  insurgents	  and	  Tigray’s	  rural	  population	  (Young,	  1998).	  
	  
	   For	  the	  Derg	  government,	  it	  was	  a	  critical	  element	  of	  their	  land	  reform	  policies	  to	  prohibit	  
the	  hiring	  of	  labour.	  This	  was	  bitterly	  resented	  among	  Tigrayans.	  It	  was	  thus	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  TPLF	  to	  
initiate	  land	  reform	  policies	  that	  would	  foster	  support	  from	  the	  masses	  (Young,	  1998).	  The	  TPLF	  
placed	  an	  emphasis	  on	  involving	  the	  community	  in	  the	  process	  of	  land	  distribution	  and	  committees	  
of	  peasants	  of	  varying	  wealth	  were	  elected	  to	  execute	  the	  reforms	  (Young,	  1998).	  Because	  of	  these	  
policies	  and	  committees,	  in	  many	  locales	  within	  Tigray	  the	  land	  was	  divided	  between	  people	  in	  
accordance	  with	  a	  number	  of	  factors,	  including	  the	  location	  of	  the	  land,	  the	  desire	  ensure	  that	  
everyone	  was	  given	  land	  near	  their	  home,	  and	  the	  fertility	  of	  the	  land.	  These	  considerations	  were	  
put	  into	  place	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  each	  peasant	  to	  get	  some	  land	  of	  quality	  (Young,	  1998).	  All	  taxes	  on	  




thus	  prohibiting	  its	  sale	  (Agazi,	  1983).	  This	  enabled	  the	  land	  reform	  process	  to	  continually	  change	  to	  
fit	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  peasants	  and	  the	  changing	  local	  military	  and	  political	  conditions	  during	  the	  civil	  
war	  years	  (Young,	  1998).	  
	  
	   The	  TPLF’s	  priority	  of	  devolving	  administrative	  authority	  to	  the	  local	  level	  resulted	  in	  highly	  
organised	  local	  administrations	  (Young,	  1998).	  The	  area	  under	  Tigray	  control	  was	  divided	  into	  four	  
administrative	  zones,	  known	  as	  zobas,	  which	  are	  then	  divided	  into	  seventy-­‐eight	  districts,	  or	  
woredas,	  and	  then	  further	  into	  the	  lowest	  level	  of	  government	  known	  as	  tabias	  (Young,	  1998).	  
Together,	  these	  made	  what	  is	  called	  the	  baito	  system.	  Anyone	  over	  the	  age	  of	  sixteen	  and	  a	  member	  
of	  the	  TPLF	  mass	  association	  could	  stand	  election	  to	  the	  baito,	  which	  then	  oversaw	  most	  factors	  of	  
daily	  life,	  including	  justice,	  security,	  agriculture,	  road	  building,	  health,	  and	  education	  (Young,	  1998;	  
Wood,	  2010).	  The	  restructuring	  of	  administration	  under	  the	  baito	  system	  in	  Tigray	  underlined	  the	  
TPLF	  insurgents’	  commitment	  to	  providing	  the	  Tigrayan	  people	  with	  better	  services	  and	  a	  
democratic	  administration	  system	  that	  fostered	  participation	  and	  accountability	  (Young,	  1998).	  Land	  
reform	  was	  a	  vital	  form	  of	  rebel	  governance	  in	  the	  Tigray	  region	  due	  to	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  
peasant	  class.	  By	  integrating	  land	  reform	  policies	  into	  the	  TPLF’s	  long-­‐term	  system	  of	  governance,	  
the	  TPLF	  was	  able	  to	  gain	  mass	  support	  from	  civilians	  in	  the	  territories	  under	  their	  control.	  	  
	  
	   The	  TPLF	  argued	  that	  the	  rural	  population’s	  poverty	  was	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  education	  
provided	  by	  the	  previous	  and	  existing	  governments.	  By	  providing	  new	  educational	  structures	  they	  
were	  able	  to	  enhance	  their	  nationalist	  appeal	  and	  encourage	  recruitment	  (Young,	  1998).	  Whilst	  the	  
insurgents	  had	  very	  limited	  materials	  and	  financial	  resources,	  the	  TPLF	  recognised	  that	  providing	  the	  
people	  with	  an	  education	  would	  deepen	  the	  political	  and	  national	  consciousness,	  as	  well	  as	  train	  
future	  generations	  who	  could	  potentially	  be	  utilised	  in	  the	  future	  struggle	  (Young,	  1998).	  The	  TPLF’s	  
decision	  to	  prioritise	  the	  education	  of	  youths	  aged	  twelve	  to	  eighteen	  was	  due	  to	  their	  preference	  of	  




education	  by	  the	  TPLF,	  therefore,	  was	  used	  as	  an	  effective	  recruitment	  tool	  as	  it	  advanced	  the	  
political	  consciousness	  of	  the	  Tigray	  people,	  as	  well	  as	  strengthening	  loyalty	  to	  the	  insurgency	  
(Young,	  1998).	  
	  
	   Very	  early	  on	  in	  their	  insurgency,	  the	  TPLF	  recognised	  the	  oppression	  of	  women	  in	  Ethiopian	  
society	  as	  something	  that	  needed	  addressing	  (Tadesse	  and	  Young,	  2003).	  The	  TPLF	  showed	  a	  
commitment	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  women,	  predominantly	  through	  their	  land	  reform	  policies.	  
Under	  the	  regime	  of	  Emperor	  Haile-­‐Sellassie,	  women	  had	  lost	  their	  right	  to	  land	  when	  they	  divorced.	  
The	  TPLF	  altered	  this,	  granting	  divorced,	  separated,	  or	  unmarried	  women	  equal	  land	  to	  the	  men	  in	  
the	  area	  (Young,	  1998).	  It	  was	  also	  reported	  that	  a	  side	  effect	  of	  this	  policy	  was	  that	  domestic	  
violence	  reduced	  dramatically,	  as	  men	  feared	  the	  loss	  of	  half	  the	  family	  land	  if	  their	  marriage	  ended	  
(Young,	  1998).	  Additionally,	  the	  TPLF	  offered	  women	  an	  opportunity	  to	  leave	  their	  family	  lives	  and	  
join	  the	  insurgency	  in	  a	  combatant	  capacity.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  around	  one-­‐third	  of	  TPLF	  fighters	  
were	  women	  (Tadesse	  and	  Young,	  2003).	  	  
	  
	   In	  summary,	  the	  TPLF,	  whilst	  nationalist	  and	  ethnic,	  was	  not	  looking	  to	  secede.	  Instead,	  their	  
aim	  was	  to	  overthrow	  the	  repressive	  Derg	  regime	  in	  their	  area.	  The	  TPLF	  successfully	  overthrew	  the	  
Derg	  government,	  and	  defeated	  the	  significantly	  larger	  Ethiopian	  military,	  in	  1991.	  They	  did	  not	  
achieve	  this	  alone,	  instead	  its	  success	  lied	  within	  years	  of	  cleverly	  forged	  political	  and	  military	  
alliances	  with	  other	  insurgent	  groups	  (Akcinaroglu,	  2012).	  They	  can,	  however,	  be	  credited	  with	  
gathering	  mass	  popular	  support	  and	  a	  large	  number	  of	  recruits	  to	  their	  cause	  that	  came	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  the	  elements	  of	  governance	  provided	  in	  the	  Tigray	  region	  by	  the	  TPLF.	  	  
	  
5.2.2   The	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Party	  
	   The	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Party	  (EPRP)	  was	  founded	  in	  April	  1972	  by	  exiled	  




They	  emerged	  as	  the	  EPRP	  in	  August	  1975,	  after	  remaining	  clandestine	  for	  over	  three	  years	  due	  to	  
the	  ban	  on	  political	  parties	  by	  Haile-­‐Selassie’s	  regime	  (Zeleke	  and	  Ayana,	  1976).	  They	  chose	  to	  make	  
themselves	  public	  by	  declaring	  open	  war	  against	  the	  Derg	  government	  in	  1976,	  at	  a	  time	  when	  they	  
perceived	  the	  Derg	  to	  be	  totally	  isolated	  (Zeleke	  and	  Ayana,	  1976).	  Considered	  the	  “revolutionary	  
party	  of	  the	  proletariat”,	  the	  overarching	  objective	  of	  the	  class-­‐focused	  EPRP	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  
Peoples’	  Democratic	  Republic	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  revolutionary	  Marxist	  dictatorship	  of	  the	  proletariat	  
and	  the	  peasantry	  (Anon.,	  1975;	  Young,	  1998).	  The	  abolition	  of	  feudalism	  and	  imperialism	  were	  at	  
the	  forefront	  of	  the	  EPRP’s	  agenda,	  with	  other	  key	  tenants	  of	  their	  political	  programme	  including	  the	  
right	  of	  nationalities	  in	  Ethiopia	  to	  self-­‐determination,	  creating	  a	  new	  democratic	  system	  of	  
education	  and	  healthcare	  for	  the	  masses,	  and	  protecting	  the	  rights	  and	  equality	  of	  women	  (Anon.,	  
1975).	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  EPRP	  and	  the	  TPLF	  shared	  a	  common	  goal	  of	  overthrowing	  the	  Derg	  regime,	  the	  
EPRP	  failed	  to	  become	  the	  vanguard	  organisation	  in	  Tigray	  due	  to	  its	  lack	  of	  popular	  support	  from	  
the	  people	  (Young;	  1998).	  They	  concentrated	  primarily	  on	  urban	  areas,	  so	  the	  EPRP	  were	  able	  to	  
develop	  an	  initially	  well-­‐supported	  system	  among	  teachers,	  students,	  and	  civil	  servants.	  Unlike	  the	  
TPLF,	  however,	  they	  did	  not	  perceive	  the	  peasantry	  to	  be	  a	  vital	  component	  of	  the	  insurgency.	  More	  
problematically	  in	  terms	  of	  support	  and	  recruitment,	  not	  only	  did	  the	  EPRP	  fail	  to	  recognise	  that	  the	  
peasantry	  could	  be	  a	  revolutionary	  force	  in	  its	  own	  right,	  they	  perpetrated	  considerable	  violence	  
against	  peasants	  (Young,	  1998).	  Interviews	  with	  those	  who	  interacted	  with	  the	  EPRP,	  documented	  in	  
Young	  (1998),	  emphasised	  that	  the	  EPRP	  saw	  little	  need	  or	  interest	  to	  help	  those	  living	  in	  rural	  areas.	  
They	  committed	  acts	  of	  violence	  against	  those	  who	  they	  deemed	  to	  not	  be	  cooperating	  with	  their	  
plans,	  and	  they	  also	  interfered	  with	  the	  livelihoods	  of	  peasants	  by	  interrupting	  the	  sale	  of	  livestock	  
as	  they	  perceived	  people	  going	  into	  market	  towns	  would	  betray	  the	  EPRP	  insurgents	  to	  the	  Derg	  
(Young,	  1998).	  Unlike	  the	  TPLF,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  evidence	  available	  that	  the	  EPRP	  did	  not	  




to	  achieve	  their	  centre-­‐seeking	  goal	  of	  overthrowing	  the	  Derg	  regime	  and	  ascending	  to	  power.	  
Whilst	  evidence	  is	  not	  abundant	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  EPRP,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  recruitment	  occurred	  
primarily	  for	  objective	  reasons,	  and	  not	  due	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  persuasion	  in	  the	  form	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  structures.	  	  
	  
5.3   The	  Fight	  for	  Independence	  in	  Eritrea	  
Whilst	  disputes	  were	  being	  voiced	  and	  fought	  over	  in	  Ethiopia,	  the	  fight	  for	  independence	  in	  
Eritrea	  continued.	  Eritrean	  nationalism	  arose	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  region’s	  colonial	  history	  under	  Italian	  
and	  British	  rule,	  which	  lasted	  until	  1950.	  A	  shared	  Eritrean	  national	  identity	  emerged	  among	  the	  
region’s	  religiously	  and	  ethnically	  diverse	  population	  (Paul	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Once	  Ethiopia	  unilaterally	  
annexed	  Eritrea	  in	  1962,	  the	  sense	  of	  nationalism	  culminated	  with	  the	  outbreak	  of	  an	  insurgency	  
(Paul	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  twenty-­‐nine-­‐year	  struggle	  for	  self-­‐determination	  and	  liberation	  began	  as	  a	  
very	  limited,	  low-­‐level	  insurrection	  (Rock,	  1999).	  The	  insurgency	  began	  with	  hit-­‐and-­‐run	  guerrilla	  
attacks	  on	  isolated	  Ethiopian	  troops	  by	  the	  Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF).	  	  
	  
A	  parallel	  offensive	  by	  the	  EPLF	  in	  Eritrea	  and	  the	  TPLF	  in	  Ethiopia	  enabled	  the	  outright	  
military	  victory	  that	  enabled	  the	  independence	  of	  Eritrea	  and	  the	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Derg	  regime	  
in	  May	  1991.	  Eritrea’s	  official	  independence	  was	  achieved	  and	  recognised	  in	  April	  1993,	  following	  a	  
UN-­‐sponsored	  referendum	  in	  which	  the	  98.8%	  vote	  for	  independence	  was	  declared	  free	  and	  fair	  by	  
both	  regional	  and	  international	  observers	  (Rock,	  1999).	  Whilst	  military	  capabilities	  played	  a	  role	  in	  
the	  decisive	  defeat	  of	  Ethiopian	  occupation	  in	  Eritrea,	  the	  extensive	  system	  of	  governance	  
established	  by	  the	  EPLF	  enabled	  the	  region	  to	  achieve	  legitimacy	  and	  recognition	  from	  the	  
international	  community.	  During	  the	  fight	  for	  liberation	  and	  in	  the	  immediate	  aftermath,	  Eritrean	  
people	  had	  the	  lowest	  income	  per	  capita	  in	  the	  world	  (Pateman,	  1990).	  Furthermore,	  an	  estimated	  
60,000	  combatants	  were	  killed	  and	  one	  million	  Eritreans	  became	  refugees	  or	  exiles	  during	  the	  fight	  




build	  up	  a	  society	  from	  the	  inside	  out	  that	  that	  Pateman	  (1990)	  considers	  a	  model	  of	  development.	  
Beginning	  with	  the	  ELF	  and	  then	  going	  into	  greater	  depth	  about	  the	  governance	  provided	  by	  the	  
EPLF,	  the	  following	  sections	  provide	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  theory	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  
are	  more	  likely	  to	  establish	  systems	  of	  governance	  within	  the	  territories	  that	  they	  control.	  	  	  
	  
5.3.1   Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF)	  
	   The	  first	  movement	  of	  the	  secessionist	  insurgency	  in	  Eritrea,	  the	  ELF	  emerged	  as	  the	  only	  
armed	  nationalist	  force	  in	  Eritrea	  (Connell,	  2001).	  The	  ELF	  was	  organised	  into	  autonomous	  
geographical	  regional	  divisions,	  based	  on	  ethnic	  or	  clan-­‐based	  divisions.	  By	  structuring	  this	  way,	  the	  
ELF	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  care	  up	  Eritrea	  into	  personal	  domains,	  allied	  with	  one	  another	  but	  not	  
functioning	  as	  a	  coordinated	  political	  movement	  (Connell,	  2001).	  Combatants	  were	  distributed	  
throughout	  the	  regions	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  religion,	  ethnicity,	  and	  tribe	  and	  consequently	  recruitment	  
was	  driven	  along	  the	  religious,	  ethnic,	  and	  tribal	  affiliations,	  as	  well	  as	  from	  a	  number	  of	  badly	  
organised	  urban	  nationalist	  groups	  that	  had	  existed	  prior	  to	  the	  ELF’s	  formation	  (Pool,	  1980;	  
Woldemikael,	  1991).	  Whilst	  the	  ELF’s	  focus	  on	  religious	  and	  ethnic	  cleavages	  assisted	  recruitment	  
among	  those	  previously	  active	  in	  Eritrean	  politics	  in	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s,	  it	  did	  little	  to	  persuade	  
younger	  better	  educated	  Eritreans	  to	  join	  the	  ELF’s	  movement	  (Woldemikael,	  1991).	  Furthermore,	  
evidence	  provided	  by	  Connell	  (2001)	  and	  Mekonnen	  (2013)	  suggested	  that	  the	  ELF	  leaders	  often	  
punished	  and	  executed	  those	  they	  suspected	  of	  disloyalty,	  which	  fuelled	  internal	  divisions	  and	  
hindered	  recruitment	  among	  Eritrean	  civilians.	  The	  ELF’s	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  divisions	  dominated	  its	  
political	  and	  military	  structures,	  and	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  ELF’s	  preoccupation	  with	  ethnicity	  and	  
religion	  hindered	  their	  recruitment	  process	  (Pool,	  1980;	  Riggan,	  2016).	  	  
	  
	   The	  ELF’s	  religious	  dimension,	  which	  was	  portrayed	  as	  a	  predominantly	  Arab	  and	  Muslim	  
struggle	  by	  its	  leaders,	  served	  as	  propaganda	  to	  raise	  finance	  and	  support	  from	  a	  number	  of	  Arab	  




support	  that	  the	  ELF	  received,	  the	  insurgents	  used	  military	  means	  to	  extract	  resources	  from	  Eritrean	  
civilians.	  The	  ELF’s	  military	  activities	  were	  used	  as	  a	  mechanism	  through	  which	  they	  could	  apply	  
pressure	  on	  the	  population	  to	  supply	  resources	  such	  as	  food	  and	  intelligence	  to	  the	  group	  (Pool,	  
1980;	  Mekonnen,	  2013).	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  ELF	  relied	  on	  external	  financing	  from	  Arab	  regimes	  and	  
military	  means	  directed	  at	  local	  civilians	  in	  order	  to	  fund	  their	  insurgency,	  rather	  than	  a	  system	  of	  
rebel	  governance	  to	  encourage	  assistance	  from	  among	  the	  Eritrean	  population.	  	  
	  
The	  ELF	  was	  rife	  with	  internal	  divisions	  and	  pressure	  from	  within	  which	  demanded	  change	  in	  
the	  way	  that	  the	  ELF	  conducted	  its	  tactics	  and	  strategy	  (Pool,	  1980).	  The	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  
Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF)	  emerged	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  cleavages	  that	  had	  
dominated	  the	  ELF	  (Woldemikael,	  1991).	  Former	  ELF	  combatants	  formed	  the	  EPLF	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  
move	  away	  from	  the	  divisions	  that	  had	  beset	  the	  ELF.	  The	  splintering	  of	  the	  EPLF	  away	  from	  the	  ELF	  
led	  to	  a	  bloody	  civil	  war	  between	  the	  two	  organisations,	  contributing	  to	  the	  deaths	  of	  thousands	  of	  
combatants,	  until	  1982	  when	  the	  EPLF	  defeated	  the	  ELF	  and	  the	  latter	  was	  driven	  out	  of	  Eritrea	  
(Mekonnen,	  2013).	  As	  this	  paper	  will	  present	  in	  the	  following	  sections,	  the	  EPLF	  was	  able	  to	  produce	  
a	  more	  coherent	  unified	  national	  identity,	  through	  establishing	  governance	  structures	  that	  replaced	  
the	  existing	  state	  system	  and	  benefitted	  the	  population	  of	  Eritrea.	  	  
	  
5.3.2   Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF)	  
Splitting	  from	  the	  ELF	  in	  1970,	  the	  EPLF	  spearheaded	  the	  independence	  war	  until	  the	  
liberation	  of	  Eritrea	  in	  1991	  (Desta,	  2009).	  From	  1982	  onwards,	  after	  a	  decisive	  victory	  over	  the	  ELF,	  
the	  EPLF	  was	  the	  only	  effective	  opposition	  force	  in	  Eritrea	  (Rock,	  1999).	  Unlike	  the	  ELF,	  the	  EPLF	  was	  
highly	  centralised	  and	  disciplined.	  By	  appearing	  as	  a	  coherent,	  united	  organisation,	  the	  EPLF	  were	  
able	  to	  portray	  to	  the	  public	  that	  they	  were	  an	  organisation	  that	  was	  capable	  of	  replacing	  the	  
Ethiopian	  state	  (Desta,	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  EPLF	  placed	  great	  emphasis	  on	  the	  




the	  various	  religions,	  ethnicities	  and	  clans	  within	  the	  Eritrean	  public	  (Pool,	  1980;	  Dorman,	  2003).	  The	  
EPLF’s	  commitment	  to	  Marxism-­‐Leninism	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  self-­‐reliance	  led	  to	  an	  extensive	  system	  
of	  governance	  which	  oversaw	  the	  organisation	  and	  implementation	  of	  reforms	  in	  education,	  
healthcare,	  democratic	  centralism,	  land	  reform	  and	  gender	  equality	  (Connell,	  2001;	  Pool,	  2001).	  The	  
broad-­‐based	  nationalistic	  approach	  to	  the	  liberation	  of	  Eritrea	  guided	  the	  EPLF’s	  adoption	  of	  state-­‐
like	  qualities;	  for	  them,	  military	  victory	  and	  independence	  were	  not	  the	  sole	  purposes	  of	  the	  war	  
(Desta,	  2009).	  Instead,	  guided	  by	  a	  clandestine	  Marxist	  vision,	  the	  EPLF	  wanted	  to	  transform	  the	  
Eritrean	  state	  and	  society	  both	  politically	  and	  socially	  (Connell,	  2001).	  This	  marked	  a	  distinct	  
departure	  from	  the	  ELF,	  who’s	  primary	  focus	  was	  on	  liberation	  and	  not	  the	  larger	  task	  of	  social	  
transformation	  and	  nation	  building	  (Riggan,	  2016).	  
	  
During	  the	  colonial	  era,	  the	  education	  system	  had	  been	  designed	  for	  the	  personal	  benefit	  of	  
a	  small	  group	  of	  elites	  (Desta,	  2009).	  Eritreans	  were	  further	  hindered	  when	  annexed	  by	  Ethiopia	  due	  
to	  the	  implementation	  of	  Amharic,	  the	  Ethiopian	  language,	  as	  the	  language	  within	  schools	  (Desta,	  
2009).	  The	  EPLF,	  however,	  believed	  that	  education	  should	  serve	  the	  common	  good	  of	  the	  masses,	  
and	  by	  doing	  so,	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  change	  would	  be	  facilitated.	  In	  1976	  alone,	  thirty-­‐six	  
schools	  were	  opened	  in	  EPLF	  areas,	  and	  by	  1987,	  an	  estimated	  25,000	  students	  were	  enrolled	  in	  125	  
schools	  (Desta,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  the	  EPLF	  opened	  the	  “Revolutionary	  School”	  in	  their	  base	  area	  
for	  2,500	  orphans,	  refugee	  children,	  and	  the	  children	  of	  EPLF	  fighters	  (Desta,	  2009).	  Alongside	  
regular	  curricular	  subjects,	  political	  education	  was	  a	  constant	  feature	  under	  the	  EPLF.	  Ranging	  from	  
small	  meetings	  to	  large	  public	  village	  seminars,	  a	  political	  education	  program	  was	  implemented	  in	  
order	  to	  increase	  morale,	  teach	  the	  masses	  about	  the	  meaning	  and	  method	  of	  political	  struggle,	  and	  
to	  discredit	  the	  enemy	  (Connell,	  2001).	  Education	  was	  important	  for	  combatants	  as	  well	  as	  civilians;	  
a	  higher	  level	  of	  literacy	  and	  education	  among	  the	  fighters	  would	  ensure	  a	  more	  effective	  and	  
motivated	  fighting	  force	  (Desta,	  2009).	  The	  focus	  on	  adult	  literacy	  saw	  combatants	  routinely	  meet	  




(Connell,	  2001).	  In	  1982	  alone,	  nearly	  10,000	  Eritreans	  enrolled	  in	  the	  EPLF’s	  literacy	  courses	  (Desta,	  
2009).	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  EPLF’s	  commitment	  to	  rebel	  governance	  through	  their	  education	  system	  
facilitated	  essential	  recruitment	  from	  among	  the	  local	  populace.	  
	  
The	  health	  sector,	  like	  the	  education	  sector,	  during	  the	  colonial	  period	  was	  focused	  on	  solely	  
providing	  for	  the	  colonists,	  leaving	  most	  of	  the	  indigenous	  population	  to	  rely	  on	  traditional	  forms	  of	  
medicine	  (Desta,	  2009).	  The	  EPLF	  were	  faced	  with	  a	  challenging	  task;	  the	  Eritrean	  population	  was	  
largely	  illiterate,	  with	  very	  few	  trained	  medical	  personnel.	  They	  were	  further	  hindered	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  
resources,	  the	  geographical	  isolation	  of	  EPLF	  areas,	  and	  the	  general	  problems	  created	  by	  war	  (Desta,	  
2009).	  In	  order	  to	  combat	  this,	  over	  1,500	  ‘barefoot	  doctors’	  were	  trained,	  as	  well	  as	  forty	  village	  
health	  workers,	  midwives,	  and	  specialist	  medical	  personnel	  (Desta,	  2009).	  By	  1984,	  the	  EPLF’s	  Health	  
Department	  was	  running	  six	  regional	  hospitals,	  eight	  health	  centres,	  fifteen	  health	  stations,	  and	  over	  
forty	  mobile	  teams	  (Desta,	  2009).	  Twice	  during	  the	  civil	  war	  period,	  between	  1974-­‐74	  and	  again	  
between	  1983-­‐85,	  drought	  escalated	  to	  the	  level	  of	  famine.	  The	  contested	  Ethiopian	  sovereignty	  
over	  the	  rebel-­‐held	  area	  of	  Eritrea	  contributed	  to	  the	  reluctance	  of	  the	  UN	  and	  other	  major	  donors	  
to	  provide	  relief	  aid	  (Rock,	  1999).	  Relief	  operations,	  therefore,	  primarily	  fell	  to	  the	  Eritrean-­‐run,	  
Khartoum-­‐based	  Eritrean	  Relief	  Association	  (ERA).	  From	  their	  logistical	  bases	  in	  Northeast	  Sudan,	  
the	  ERA	  mounted	  cross-­‐border	  relief	  operations	  in	  association	  with	  the	  EPLF	  Health	  Department,	  
ensuring	  that	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  vulnerable	  population	  received	  food	  and	  access	  to	  health	  units	  
(Pool,	  1993;	  Connell,	  2001;	  Huang,	  2012).	  Like	  the	  EPLF’s	  education	  system,	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  
health	  system	  that	  benefitted	  the	  local	  population,	  particularly	  during	  a	  period	  where	  a	  large	  
proportion	  of	  the	  population	  were	  in	  urgent	  need,	  was	  an	  important	  feature	  of	  the	  insurgency	  as	  it	  
assisted	  in	  gathering	  recruits	  and	  support.	  
	  
	   One	  of	  the	  EPLF’s	  most	  decisive	  interventions	  was	  the	  village	  democratisation	  that	  occurred	  




Eritreans	  to	  participate	  directly	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  (Pateman,	  1993).	  Society	  was	  
reorganised	  on	  a	  more	  egalitarian	  basis,	  exemplified	  by	  the	  elected	  administrations,	  known	  as	  
People’s	  Assemblies.	  The	  system	  was	  based	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  five	  new	  ‘national	  unions’,	  for	  
women,	  workers,	  students,	  peasants,	  and	  professionals	  (Pateman,	  1993;	  Desta,	  2009).	  Along	  with	  
the	  military	  branch	  of	  the	  EPLF,	  the	  six	  national	  unions	  were	  responsible	  for	  selecting	  its	  own	  
representative	  to	  a	  national	  congress,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  local-­‐level	  People’s	  Assemblies.	  By	  actively	  
encouraging	  participation	  in	  the	  elective	  and	  decision-­‐making	  processes,	  the	  EPLF,	  motivated	  by	  
their	  political	  principles,	  signalled	  that	  they	  were	  committed	  to	  empowering	  the	  majority,	  who	  had	  
previously	  been	  disenfranchised	  by	  the	  colonial	  system	  (Desta,	  2009).	  
	  
	   Under	  the	  colonial	  system,	  colonial	  authorities,	  feudal	  landlords,	  and	  collaborators	  increased	  
their	  land	  holdings,	  taking	  land	  away	  from	  Eritrean	  families	  and	  leaving	  as	  many	  as	  forty	  percent	  of	  
families	  without	  land	  (Pateman,	  1993).	  The	  pre-­‐colonisation	  society	  had	  operated	  a	  complex	  system	  
of	  land	  tenure	  involving	  communal	  ownership	  and	  the	  redistribution	  of	  land	  every	  five	  to	  seven	  
years	  in	  order	  to	  give	  all	  married	  men	  the	  chance	  to	  farm	  the	  more	  fertile	  land	  (Pateman,	  1993).	  The	  
EPLF	  reinstated	  the	  system	  of	  communal	  ownership,	  whilst	  making	  it	  a	  fairer,	  more	  equal	  system.	  As	  
a	  predominantly	  agrarian	  society,	  with	  at	  least	  eighty	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  living	  in	  rural	  areas,	  
it	  was	  important	  for	  the	  EPLF	  to	  improve	  agriculture	  and	  rural	  productivity	  (Pateman,	  1993;	  Connell,	  
2001).	  By	  implementing	  policies	  that	  economically	  benefitted	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  Eritrean	  
population,	  the	  EPLF	  gained	  recruits,	  support	  and	  resources	  from	  the	  population.	  
	  
	   Traditionally	  Eritrean	  women	  were	  considerably	  oppressed;	  they	  were	  excluded	  from	  land	  
ownership,	  they	  played	  no	  role	  in	  social	  or	  political	  decision	  making,	  and	  marriage	  was	  essentially	  an	  
economic	  transaction	  decided	  upon	  by	  male	  heads	  of	  families	  (Wilson,	  1991;	  Desta,	  2009).	  Under	  
the	  EPLF,	  traditional	  gender	  perceptions	  and	  roles	  were	  modernised.	  Women’s	  emancipation	  was	  




(Matsuoka	  and	  Sorenson,	  1998).	  An	  estimated	  thirty	  percent	  of	  active	  EPLF	  militants	  were	  women	  
(Pool,	  1980;	  Desta,	  2009).	  As	  well	  as	  combatant	  roles,	  women	  joined	  the	  movement	  as	  tailors,	  
teachers,	  mechanics,	  technicians,	  and	  doctors,	  with	  a	  guarantee	  from	  the	  EPLF	  that	  they	  would	  
receive	  equal	  pay	  for	  equal	  work	  (Pateman,	  1993;	  Matsuoka	  and	  Sorenson,	  1998).	  By	  increasing	  
gender	  equality,	  the	  EPLF	  were	  able	  to	  increase	  their	  recruitment	  pool,	  contributing	  to	  their	  
eventual	  success	  over	  the	  Ethiopian	  military.	  	  
	  
	   The	  EPLF	  implemented	  a	  vast	  system	  of	  governance	  that	  proved	  its	  capability	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  
statebuilding	  (Huang,	  2012).	  For	  two	  decades,	  the	  EPLF	  coherently	  constructed	  a	  unified	  sense	  of	  
Eritrean	  identity	  and	  effectively	  replaced	  state	  institutions	  that	  would	  endure	  even	  after	  secession	  
(Riggan,	  2016).	  The	  war	  of	  liberation	  not	  only	  led	  to	  Eritrea	  becoming	  an	  internationally-­‐recognised	  
independent	  state,	  but	  it	  also	  marked	  a	  social	  transformation	  of	  the	  state	  through	  the	  construction	  
of	  a	  national	  ideology	  and	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  that	  promoted	  it	  (Riggan,	  2016).	  
	  
5.4   Some	  Concluding	  Comments	  
Ethiopia	  makes	  a	  complex	  case	  study	  as	  there	  were	  effectively	  two	  simultaneous	  civil	  wars	  
occurring	  at	  the	  same	  time;	  Eritrea’s	  war	  of	  liberation	  from	  Ethiopia	  was	  spontaneously	  occurring	  
alongside	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  Ethiopia	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Derg	  regime.	  By	  working	  through	  the	  history	  and	  
politics	  of	  the	  largest	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  Ethiopia,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  not	  always	  a	  
straightforward	  relationship	  between	  secessionist	  goals	  and	  the	  implantation	  of	  a	  governance	  
system.	  It	  is	  apparent	  that	  there	  are	  numerous	  factors	  that	  need	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  account.	  	  
	  
	   The	  case	  of	  the	  EPLF	  in	  Eritrea	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  (H1)	  that	  secessionist	  groups	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  provide	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups.	  The	  EPLF,	  a	  secessionist	  insurgency,	  
successfully	  implemented	  a	  vast	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  civilians,	  as	  well	  




implementation	  of	  new	  governance	  structures,	  designed	  to	  benefit	  the	  Eritrean	  population,	  assisted	  
their	  bid	  to	  gain	  mass	  support	  from	  the	  public.	  Through	  the	  advancement	  of	  women’s	  rights,	  land	  
reform,	  village	  democratisation,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  the	  education	  and	  health	  sectors,	  the	  EPLF	  
successfully	  achieved	  their	  goal	  of	  secession;	  governance	  was	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  their	  success.	  There	  
appears	  to	  be	  little	  evidence,	  however,	  that	  their	  predecessor,	  the	  ELF,	  implemented	  a	  rebel	  
governance	  structure,	  despite	  sharing	  with	  the	  EPLF	  a	  goal	  of	  secession.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  ELF	  
contradicts	  the	  hypothesis	  and	  complicates	  the	  theory	  which	  suggests	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  
more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgencies.	  Consequently,	  this	  
case	  study	  requires	  additional	  clarification	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  (H1)	  which	  states	  that	  “insurgent	  
groups	  who	  wish	  to	  secede	  from	  the	  state	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  provide	  systems	  of	  governance	  than	  
those	  who	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  secede”.	  	  
	  
	   The	  situation	  in	  Ethiopia	  varied	  across	  time	  and	  region,	  and	  this	  case	  study,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
internal	  conflicts	  within	  Ethiopia,	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  was	  not	  fully	  correct.	  Some	  of	  
the	  insurgent	  groups	  looked	  at	  in	  this	  case	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  insurgent	  groups	  not	  seeking	  
a	  secession	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  implement	  governance.	  The	  EPRP,	  for	  example,	  appears	  to	  have	  done	  
little	  to	  implement	  governance	  in	  the	  urban	  areas	  that	  they	  controlled.	  Instead,	  they	  initiated	  a	  
violent	  campaign	  against	  the	  Derg.	  Despite	  their	  lack	  of	  success	  in	  achieving	  their	  goal	  of	  
overthrowing	  the	  Derg	  regime,	  their	  case	  supports	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgencies	  
are	  less	  likely	  to	  implement	  governance	  structures.	  This	  is	  because	  they	  had	  less	  need	  to	  gain	  
recognition	  and	  legitimacy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  TPLF,	  unlike	  the	  EPRP,	  did	  implement	  an	  







6   A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Somalia	  (c1991-­‐)	  
6.1   Introduction	  to	  Modern	  Somalia’s	  Political	  Struggles	  
The	  complex	  politics	  and	  political	  vacuums	  which	  emerged	  in	  Somalia	  provide	  a	  previously	  
unexplored	  case	  study	  into	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance.	  This	  case	  study,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  
methodology	  section,	  was	  chosen	  at	  random,	  by	  exploring	  the	  civil-­‐war	  history	  of	  modern	  Somalia	  
this	  case	  study	  brings	  to	  light	  how	  a	  number	  of	  different	  insurgent	  groups	  came	  to	  co-­‐exist	  in	  the	  
region	  and	  the	  different	  approaches	  they	  took	  to	  proposed	  and	  actual	  governance.	  Table	  2	  presents	  
the	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  throughout	  this	  section.	  From	  my	  theoretical	  framework,	  
I	  hypothesised	  that	  the	  United	  Somali	  Congress	  (USC),	  the	  Islamic	  Courts	  Union	  (ICU)	  and	  al-­‐Shabaab	  
would	  not	  produce	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  due	  to	  their	  non-­‐secessionist	  goals.	  Additionally,	  I	  
hypothesised	  that	  the	  Somali	  National	  Movement	  (SNM)	  would	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  
structures	  due	  to	  their	  secessionist	  motivations.	  	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Somalian	  Rebel	  Groups	  in	  Order	  of	  Discussion	  
Insurgent	  Group	   Secessionist?	   Expected	  rebel	  
governance?	  
Evidence	  of	  rebel	  
governance?	  
USC	   No	   No	   No	  
ICU	   No	   No	   Yes	  
Al-­‐Shabaab	   No	   No	   Yes	  
SNM	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
	  
	  
Somalia	  has	  been	  a	  fractured	  country	  for	  much	  of	  its	  existence,	  shaped	  by	  a	  culture	  of	  
decentralization	  and	  genealogy	  (Clark,	  1992/3).	  Ahmed	  (2007)	  describes	  Somalia	  as	  a	  testing	  ground	  




ideas.	  Nationalism	  in	  other	  former	  colonial	  states	  commonly	  developed	  as	  an	  opposition	  to	  colonial	  
rule,	  however	  Somalia	  was	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  was	  uniquely	  fragmented	  and	  divided	  into	  five	  regional	  
groupings;	  French	  Somaliland,	  the	  British	  Somaliland	  protectorate,	  the	  Italian	  colony	  of	  Somalia,	  the	  
Ethiopian	  Ogaden,	  and	  British	  northern	  Kenya	  (Lewis,	  2004).	  These	  “artificial	  divisions”,	  each	  with	  
different	  administrative	  traditions	  and	  languages,	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  politicisation	  of	  modern	  
Somali	  culture	  that	  developed	  upon	  independence	  (Lewis,	  2004).	  Following	  the	  unification	  of	  British	  
and	  Italian	  colonies	  in	  1960	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  independent	  state	  of	  Somalia,	  the	  east	  African	  
nation	  has	  been	  embroiled	  in	  internal	  conflict.	  Byrden	  (1999)	  credits	  prolonged	  conflict	  to	  the	  
“absurd	  colonial	  dismemberment”	  of	  Somalia	  between	  five	  sovereign	  states	  that	  left	  Somalia	  
tragically	  underprepared	  for	  independence	  and	  statehood.	  Genealogy	  and	  clannism	  have	  historically	  
dominated	  the	  foundation	  of	  order	  in	  Somali	  society,	  and	  the	  ongoing	  conflict	  and	  inherent	  
instability	  stems	  from	  this	  clan-­‐based	  system	  (Clark,	  1992/3).	  The	  pastoral	  clan	  organisation	  of	  
Somali	  society	  has	  contributed	  to	  structural	  competition	  and	  continually	  shifting	  alliances	  between	  
different	  subclans	  within	  a	  clan	  family.	  Subclans	  vie	  with	  each	  other	  for	  resources,	  but,	  when	  
threatened,	  will	  unify	  against	  a	  rival	  clan	  (Paul,	  Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  2014).	  Furthermore,	  these	  
powerful	  local	  actors	  have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  continued	  state	  failure,	  in	  order	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  
economic	  and	  political	  interests.	  
	  
Invoking	  the	  Somali	  political	  economy	  provides	  one	  explanation	  that	  seeks	  to	  explain	  the	  
self-­‐perpetuating	  state	  failure	  that	  has	  plagued	  Somalia.	  Menkhaus	  (2005,	  2006/7,	  2008,	  2009,	  
2014)	  has	  written	  extensively	  on	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  Somalia.	  He	  argues	  that	  the	  culture	  of	  statelessness,	  
nomadism,	  and	  clannism	  present	  in	  Somalia	  are	  driving	  forces	  against	  the	  building	  of	  formal	  political	  
institutions	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  Moreover,	  the	  new	  generation	  of	  Somali	  political	  elites	  encourage	  a	  
dysfunctional	  political	  culture	  that	  emphasises	  the	  manipulation	  of	  one’s	  clan	  identity	  for	  personal	  
gain	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  This	  has	  enabled	  politics	  in	  Somalia	  to	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  mechanism	  to	  pursue	  




youthful	  population	  (thirty-­‐five	  and	  under)	  have	  no	  living	  memory	  of	  a	  functional	  state	  (Menkhaus,	  
2014).	  The	  prevailing	  survival	  culture	  and	  risk	  aversion	  that	  exists	  in	  Somalia	  causes	  the	  civilian	  
population	  to	  settle	  for	  a	  suboptimal	  outcome	  (Menkhaus,	  2006/7).	  
	  
An	  additional	  explanation	  of	  Somalia’s	  protracted	  state	  failure	  is	  the	  involvement	  of	  external	  
actors	  and	  the	  failed	  policies	  of	  international	  organisations.	  In	  their	  attempts	  at	  restoring	  a	  
functional	  government,	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  African	  Union,	  and	  Western	  powers	  failed	  to	  
account	  for	  Somalia’s	  cultural	  and	  political	  differences.	  Instead,	  they	  attempted	  to	  impose	  a	  
universal	  template	  of	  governance,	  ignoring	  the	  importance	  of	  local-­‐level	  government	  in	  Somali	  
political	  culture	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  functioning	  federal	  government	  for	  nearly	  three	  
decades	  contributes	  to	  the	  little	  faith	  that	  Somali’s	  appear	  to	  have	  in	  a	  national	  government.	  The	  
Somali	  national	  consciousness	  has	  been	  further	  scarred,	  however,	  by	  the	  numerous	  famines	  that	  
highlight	  the	  inability	  of	  a	  national	  government	  to	  provide	  food	  for	  its	  citizens	  (Webersik,	  2004).	  
Somalia	  has	  seen	  some	  of	  the	  world’s	  worst	  humanitarian	  crises,	  with	  an	  estimated	  1.3	  million	  
internally	  displaced	  persons	  and	  3.5	  million	  in	  need	  of	  emergency	  aid	  in	  2009	  alone	  (Menkhaus,	  
2009).	  The	  ongoing	  natural	  disasters	  has	  contributed	  to	  an	  opportunity	  structure	  that	  has	  fuelled	  the	  
looting	  of	  private	  homes,	  businesses,	  and	  farms,	  as	  well	  as	  contributing	  massively	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  
Somalis	  joining	  or	  associating	  with	  various	  actors,	  such	  as	  terrorist	  organisations,	  criminal	  gangs,	  and	  
pirates	  (Menkhaus,	  2006/7;	  Paul,	  Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  2014).	  
	  
The	  attempts	  at	  governance	  analysed	  in	  this	  section	  are	  confined	  to	  the	  current	  civil	  war	  
ongoing	  in	  Somalia,	  triggered	  by	  the	  overthrow	  of	  Siad	  Barre’s	  regime	  in	  1991.	  Whilst	  the	  analysis	  
only	  considers	  the	  insurgencies	  in	  the	  post-­‐1991	  era,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognise	  that	  substantial	  
human	  rights	  violations	  and	  violence	  existed	  long	  before	  this.	  The	  beginning	  of	  state	  violations	  
against	  civilians	  began	  in	  1969	  with	  the	  ascension	  of	  Major	  General	  Mohamed	  Siad	  Barre	  into	  the	  




violence	  and	  human	  rights	  abuses,	  including	  torture,	  extrajudicial	  detentions,	  collective	  
punishments,	  clan	  cleansing,	  mass	  executions,	  and	  internal	  displacements	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  During	  
the	  Barre	  regime,	  divide-­‐and-­‐rule	  tactics	  pitted	  clans	  against	  each	  other,	  leading	  to	  a	  fierce	  
competition	  for	  resources	  in	  an	  already	  resource-­‐scarce	  environment	  (Paul,	  Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  
2014).	  The	  “real	  agony”	  of	  Somalia	  began	  with	  total	  state	  collapse	  on	  26th	  January	  1991,	  when	  Barre	  
was	  overthrown	  by	  United	  Somali	  Congress	  (USC)	  rebels	  and	  fled	  the	  presidential	  palace	  in	  
Mogadishu	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  Since	  then,	  Somalia	  has	  been	  without	  a	  functional	  central	  government,	  
making	  it	  the	  longest-­‐running	  of	  complete	  state	  collapse	  in	  post-­‐colonial	  history	  (Menkhaus,	  
2006/7).	  Somalia	  has	  seen	  fighting	  in	  every	  corner	  of	  the	  country,	  involving	  both	  non-­‐state	  actors	  
(such	  as	  warlords,	  the	  Union	  of	  Islamic	  Courts,	  and	  al-­‐Shabaab)	  and	  external	  actors	  (like	  the	  United	  
Nations	  Operations	  in	  Somalia,	  Ethiopian,	  Kenyan,	  and	  Ugandan	  militaries,	  and	  the	  African	  Union	  
Mission	  in	  Somalia).	  Somali	  scholar,	  Hassan	  Cali	  Mire,	  phrased	  the	  outbreak	  of	  conflict	  in	  Somalia	  
best:	  it	  was	  as	  though	  “all	  the	  pent-­‐up	  frustrations	  of	  three	  decades	  of	  postcolonial	  independence	  
exploded	  into	  the	  ugly	  rise	  of	  fratricide,	  which	  has	  made	  the	  barbaric	  killing	  of	  innocent	  members	  of	  
other	  kin	  communities	  a	  worthy	  goal.”	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  	  
	  
	  
6.1.1   United	  Somali	  Congress	  
The	  post-­‐1991	  tumultuous	  period	  commenced	  with	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Barre	  regime.	  
Formed	  in	  1987	  as	  a	  response	  to	  the	  brutal	  treatment	  of	  the	  Hiwaye	  clan	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Barre	  
regime,	  the	  United	  Somali	  Congress	  (USC)	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  ousting	  Barre’s	  government	  and	  is	  
the	  first	  of	  four	  groups	  which	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  who	  sought	  leadership	  throughout	  the	  
civil	  war	  (Samatar,	  1992).	  Declaring	  themselves	  victorious	  in	  January	  1991,	  the	  USC	  initiated	  a	  
program	  of	  clan	  cleansing	  by	  instigating	  large-­‐scale	  communal	  violence	  against	  members	  of	  Barre’s	  
Darood	  clan	  in	  areas	  across	  southern	  Somalia	  and	  Mogadishu	  (Kapteijns,	  2012).	  The	  USC’s	  clan-­‐




displacement	  of	  400,000	  Somalis,	  the	  looting	  of	  properties,	  and	  the	  raping	  of	  women	  (Kapteijns,	  
2012).	  	  
	  
The	  initial	  goal	  of	  the	  USC	  had	  been	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Barre	  regime	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
atrocities	  committed	  against	  the	  Hawiye	  tribe.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  USC	  had	  few	  though-­‐out	  plans	  
for	  once	  they	  had	  achieved	  this	  goal,	  and	  no	  future	  plans	  for	  repairing	  Somalia’s	  institutional	  
capacity	  or	  restoring	  peace	  (Samatar,	  1992).	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  USC	  did	  very	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  
governance.	  With	  the	  USC	  in	  charge,	  Mogadishu	  was	  engulfed	  in	  “utter	  mayhem”	  as	  numerous	  
militias	  engaged	  in	  fighting	  with	  the	  USC,	  whilst	  simultaneously	  looting,	  pillaging,	  and	  killing	  civilians	  
(Abdullahi,	  2014).	  During	  the	  contests	  for	  strategic	  locations,	  such	  as	  the	  airport	  and	  the	  seaport,	  the	  
USC	  leadership	  were	  powerless	  over	  their	  combatants,	  losing	  control	  of	  its	  militia	  (Samatar,	  1992;	  
Adam,	  1995).	  Anarchy	  ensued;	  all	  state	  property,	  including	  factories	  and	  administrative	  offices,	  and	  
social	  service	  sites,	  including	  schools	  and	  hospitals,	  were	  pillaged	  and	  gradually	  destroyed	  within	  
Mogadishu	  and	  parts	  of	  southern	  Somalia	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  Fighting	  among	  USC	  factions	  and	  
various	  insurgencies	  across	  Somalia	  devastated	  crop	  growing	  regions,	  exacerbating	  famines	  and	  
preventing	  aid	  relief	  from	  reaching	  civilians	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  This	  was	  intensified	  by	  the	  scorched-­‐
earth	  policy	  of	  Barre’s	  retreating	  troops,	  who	  slaughtered	  livestock,	  ransacked	  crops,	  and	  looted	  
tools,	  and	  the	  subsequent	  counterattacks	  by	  USC	  troops	  (Stevenson,	  1993).	  	  
	  
6.1.2   Islamic	  Courts	  Union	  (ICU)	  
The	  Transitional	  Federal	  Government	  (TFG)	  was	  created	  at	  national	  reconciliation	  talks	  in	  
2004,	  in	  response	  to	  the	  general	  lawlessness	  created	  by	  the	  TFG.	  Tasked	  with	  administering	  a	  five-­‐
year	  political	  transition	  to	  create	  a	  government	  of	  national	  unity,	  the	  TFG	  was	  considered	  Somalia’s	  
“best	  hope	  for	  stability	  and	  governance”	  (Menkhaus,	  2009;	  Paul,	  Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  2014).	  The	  TFG	  
was	  backed	  by	  Ethiopia,	  a	  source	  of	  historical	  animosity	  for	  many	  Somalis,	  thus	  the	  perception	  that	  it	  




(Little,	  2012).	  The	  Islamic	  Courts	  Union	  (ICU)	  was	  a	  group	  of	  sharia	  courts	  that	  converged	  to	  form	  a	  
rival	  administration	  to	  the	  TFG,	  gaining	  supremacy	  over	  the	  many	  clan-­‐based	  factions	  that	  had	  been	  
competing	  for	  power	  since	  1991	  (Ahmad,	  2009).	  Whilst	  it	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  ICU	  was	  
formed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  general	  failures	  of	  the	  TFG,	  the	  TFG	  was	  not	  an	  insurgent	  group	  and	  is	  
subsequently	  not	  relevant	  to	  this	  study.	  Before	  discussing	  al-­‐Shabaab,	  a	  radical	  offshoot	  of	  the	  ICU,	  
who	  have	  dominated	  the	  Somali	  conflict	  since	  their	  emergence	  in	  2006,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  outline	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  politics,	  religious	  ideals,	  and	  governance	  of	  the	  short-­‐lived	  ICU	  which	  al-­‐Shabaab	  
emerged	  out	  of.	  Attention	  will	  then	  be	  turned	  to	  analysing	  the	  governance	  put	  into	  place	  by	  al-­‐
Shabaab	  and	  what	  this	  tells	  us	  about	  insurgent	  motivations	  and	  rebel	  governance.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  the	  ICU	  itself	  was	  not	  formed	  until	  2006,	  it	  has	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  when	  clans	  
established	  several	  local-­‐level	  courts	  with	  varying	  interpretations	  of	  sharia	  law.	  Somalia’s	  Islamists	  
varied	  from	  progressives	  with	  democratic	  values,	  opportunists	  using	  sharia	  courts	  to	  advance	  
personal	  gains,	  conservatives	  focused	  on	  public	  morality,	  hard-­‐liners	  who	  want	  an	  Islamic	  state	  and	  
do	  not	  advocate	  political	  violence,	  and	  jihadis	  who	  use	  violence	  as	  a	  tactic	  of	  choice	  (International	  
Crisis	  Group,	  2006).	  Central	  to	  their	  message	  was	  that	  other	  non-­‐Islamic	  identities,	  in	  particular	  clan	  
and	  ethnic	  rivalries,	  were	  responsible	  for	  the	  civil	  chaos	  that	  has	  plagued	  Somalia	  (Ahmad,	  2009).	  
The	  solution	  they	  proposed	  was	  a	  unified	  Islamic	  national	  identity	  that	  could	  provide	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  
political	  order	  (Ahmad,	  2009).	  The	  sharia	  courts	  have	  in	  fact	  been	  credited	  by	  much	  of	  the	  
population,	  as	  well	  as	  Somalia’s	  important	  business	  community,	  for	  bringing	  order	  to	  certain	  parts	  of	  
the	  country	  and	  for	  their	  opposition	  to	  warlordism	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2006;	  Harnisch,	  
2010).	  They	  were	  successful	  in	  taking	  control	  of	  much	  of	  southern	  Somalia	  for	  several	  months,	  
including	  Mogadishu,	  which	  they	  took	  from	  US-­‐backed	  militias	  in	  June	  2006,	  and	  the	  strategically	  





	   In	  terms	  of	  governance,	  and	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  declare	  and	  establish	  an	  Islamic	  State,	  the	  
ICU	  replaced	  customary	  law	  with	  strict	  sharia	  law	  (Yihdego,	  2007).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  
sharia	  courts,	  with	  their	  own	  appointed	  judge	  and	  enforcement	  militia,	  were	  used	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
dispute	  resolution	  and	  for	  prosecuting	  criminal	  activity	  (Ahmad,	  2009).	  Somalis	  living	  within	  ICU-­‐
controlled	  territories	  were	  told	  to	  abide	  with	  the	  strict	  sharia	  rules	  or	  face	  harsh	  reprisals	  (Yihdego,	  
2007).	  Whilst	  fear	  and	  threats	  certainly	  existed	  under	  the	  ICU,	  there	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  Somali	  
people	  openly	  accepted	  the	  Islamist	  movement	  as	  a	  credible	  alternative	  to	  the	  ‘state	  of	  nature’	  that	  
they	  had	  been	  living	  in	  since	  the	  outbreak	  of	  civil	  war	  (Ahmad,	  2009).	  Due	  to	  the	  past	  two	  decades	  
of	  lawlessness,	  the	  Islamic	  courts	  were,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  “closest	  semblance	  of	  institutionalised	  
political	  authority”	  within	  Somalia	  (Menkhaus,	  2005;	  Ahmad,	  2009).	  For	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  the	  
ICU	  established	  a	  form	  of	  rebel	  governance	  in	  the	  practice	  of	  sharia	  law	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  
sharia	  courts.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  ICU	  contradicts	  the	  hypothesis	  (H1),	  as	  it	  was	  a	  religiously-­‐motivated,	  
non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  group	  who	  provided	  structures	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  
	  
The	  following	  section	  of	  this	  case	  study	  will	  explore	  the	  rise	  of	  al-­‐Shabaab	  and	  the	  extensive	  
system	  of	  governance	  they	  implemented	  in	  the	  territory	  under	  its	  control.	  The	  demise	  of	  the	  ICU	  
occurred	  after	  its	  more	  radical	  elements	  declared	  jihad	  on	  Ethiopia,	  prompting	  the	  invasion	  of	  
Somalia	  by	  Ethiopian	  troops	  in	  late	  2006	  and	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  courts	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  Most	  
elements	  of	  the	  ICU	  fled	  the	  country,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  military	  wing,	  al-­‐Shabaab,	  which	  has	  
operated	  independently	  of	  the	  now-­‐defunct	  ICU	  since	  early	  2007	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  
	  
6.1.3   Al-­‐Shabaab	  
Somalia	  has	  been	  “plagued”	  by	  an	  ascendant	  Islamic	  movement	  that	  wields	  far	  more	  power	  
than	  the	  TFG	  ever	  achieved	  (Menkhaus	  2006/7).	  Although	  there	  were	  and	  are	  multiple	  rebel	  factions	  
involved	  in	  the	  Somali	  civil	  war,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  has	  dominated,	  emerging	  as	  the	  most	  coherent,	  well-­‐




(Hansen,	  2012).	  As	  just	  mentioned,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  emerged	  in	  2006	  as	  the	  radical	  fundamentalist	  
military	  off-­‐shoot	  of	  the	  ICU	  (Harnish,	  2010).	  Aligned	  with	  the	  ideology	  of	  al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  the	  global	  
jihad,	  the	  primary	  motives	  of	  al-­‐Shabaab	  were	  the	  short-­‐term	  goal	  of	  toppling	  the	  Western-­‐backed	  
government,	  and	  the	  long-­‐term	  goals	  of	  establishing	  a	  Caliphate	  to	  unite	  all	  Muslims	  and	  
implementing	  an	  Islamic	  sharia	  state	  (Bruton,	  2010;	  Harnisch,	  2010).	  Although	  al-­‐Shabaab	  formally	  
declared	  commitment	  to	  al-­‐Qaeda	  in	  February	  2010,	  their	  objectives	  are	  largely	  parochial	  and	  
geographically	  limited	  to	  Somalia	  (Bruton,	  2010;	  Jones,	  2014).	  	  
	  
The	  organisation	  developed	  from	  a	  small	  network	  of	  “Afghanistan	  alumni”,	  with	  only	  33	  
members	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  inception	  in	  2006	  (Hansen,	  2012).	  The	  political	  vacuum	  produced	  by	  
decades	  of	  instability	  and	  the	  constantly	  changing	  sources	  of	  governance	  allowed	  al-­‐Shabaab	  to	  
flourish.	  The	  group	  quickly	  expanded,	  with	  an	  estimated	  7,000-­‐9,000	  fighters	  today,	  recruiting	  
heavily	  from	  Mogadishu’s	  illiterate	  poor	  youths	  who	  were	  opportunistically	  drawn	  to	  al-­‐Shabaab	  
(Burton,	  2010;	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  2018).	  Following	  al-­‐Shabaab’s	  inception,	  swathes	  of	  
young	  men	  wearing	  shirts	  declaring	  “I	  Am	  the	  Boss”	  roamed	  Mogadishu	  and	  southern	  Somalia;	  a	  
phrase	  that	  “became	  synonymous	  [to	  Somalis]	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  is	  security	  for	  nobody	  and	  
violence	  for	  all”	  (Paul,	  Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  2014).	  Recruits	  were	  driven	  to	  join	  al-­‐Shabaab	  for	  a	  
number	  of	  reasons	  including	  financial	  gain,	  fear	  and	  forced	  recruitment,	  the	  desire	  to	  side	  with	  the	  
winner,	  clan	  grievances,	  justice	  through	  Sharia	  legislation,	  jihad,	  and	  anti-­‐Ethiopian	  sentiments	  
(Burton,	  2010).	  Ethiopia’s	  invasion	  of	  Somalia,	  from	  2006	  to	  2009,	  was	  particularly	  important	  in	  
creating	  a	  fertile	  breeding	  ground	  for	  insurgent	  organisations	  to	  thrive;	  the	  invasion	  of	  foreign	  forces	  
impelled	  al-­‐Shabaab	  to	  organise,	  thus	  aiding	  its	  recruitment	  (Menkhaus,	  2009;	  Hensen,	  2012).	  
Additionally,	  a	  climate	  of	  corruption	  generated	  by	  the	  misuse	  of	  funds	  by	  the	  Western-­‐backed	  
government	  attempts	  enabled	  al-­‐Shabaab	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  credible	  alternative	  (Hansen,	  2012).	  To	  
sum,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  is	  a	  radical	  Islamist	  group	  who	  have	  a	  mixture	  of	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  goals,	  with	  




evidence	  that	  al-­‐Shabaab	  implemented	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  the	  territories	  it	  controlled	  across	  
southern,	  and	  in	  some	  localities	  operating	  shadow	  governments	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  	  
	  
It	  has	  been	  argued	  by	  Hansen	  (2013)	  that	  Al-­‐Shabaab’s	  record	  of	  governance	  has	  been	  “far	  
superior”	  to	  other	  attempts	  of	  governance	  by	  various	  factions,	  including	  those	  who	  have	  been	  
externally	  sponsored	  by	  various	  international	  actors.	  Emerging	  as	  one	  of	  the	  most	  coherent	  and	  
well-­‐organised	  administrations	  that	  southern	  Somalia	  has	  known,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  successfully	  organised	  
local	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  areas	  that	  it	  controlled,	  even	  after	  periods	  of	  sustained	  chaos	  and	  violence	  
(Hansen,	  2013).	  In	  order	  to	  be	  relevant	  on	  the	  localised	  clan	  level	  –	  a	  highly	  important	  factor	  of	  
Somali	  society	  –	  al-­‐Shabaab	  had	  to	  be	  responsive	  to	  Somali	  issues	  that	  had	  little	  to	  do	  with	  a	  
globalist	  ideology	  (Hansen,	  2013).	  Additionally,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  had	  to	  appear	  as	  a	  credible	  alternative	  to	  
the	  TFG,	  thus	  they	  had	  to	  convince	  the	  local	  populations	  in	  southern	  Somalia	  –	  through	  both	  
coercive	  and	  supportive	  means	  –	  that	  they	  were	  the	  better	  option	  (Anderson	  and	  McKnight,	  2015).	  	  
	  
The	  support	  received	  from	  numerous	  Somali	  clans	  meant	  that	  the	  insurgents	  had	  to	  adopt	  a	  
more	  active	  political	  position	  in	  order	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  their	  promises.	  In	  this	  respect,	  al-­‐
Shabaab	  was	  required	  to	  govern	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  relevant	  and	  receive	  on-­‐going	  support.	  They	  did	  this	  
through	  a	  number	  of	  mechanisms;	  firstly,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  produced	  an	  effective	  taxation	  system	  in	  the	  
areas	  under	  their	  control	  in	  southern	  Somalia.	  Through	  the	  taxation	  of	  trade,	  particularly	  in	  vital	  
economic	  bases	  such	  as	  the	  port	  of	  Kismayu,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  pursued	  rent-­‐seeking	  activities	  on	  major	  
exports	  (Anderson	  and	  McKnight,	  2014,	  2015;	  Bryden,	  2014).	  This	  system	  of	  revenue-­‐raising	  proved	  
extremely	  lucrative	  for	  the	  al-­‐Shabaab	  insurgency,	  particularly	  whilst	  engaging	  in	  conflict	  against	  
better	  funded	  internal	  and	  external	  actors.	  Additionally,	  the	  income	  raised	  from	  rent-­‐seeking	  and	  
taxation	  enabled	  al-­‐Shabaab	  to	  pursue	  a	  substantial	  recruitment	  program.	  Economic	  deprivation	  
was	  rife	  among	  young	  Somalis,	  thus	  the	  provision	  of	  protection	  and	  social	  services	  was	  a	  key	  




from	  $60-­‐200	  a	  month,	  thus	  the	  opportunity	  to	  provide	  for	  family	  members	  was	  and	  is	  a	  driving	  
force	  in	  widespread	  recruitment	  in	  the	  economically	  deprived	  southern	  Somalia	  (Anderson	  and	  
McKnight,	  2015).	  Furthermore,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  reportedly	  collected	  a	  tax,	  known	  as	  zakat,	  from	  
communities	  under	  its	  control	  and	  re-­‐distributes	  it	  to	  those	  most	  in	  need	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  In	  doing	  
so,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  were	  effectively	  able	  to	  buy	  both	  recruits	  and	  support	  from	  within	  the	  populations	  it	  
governed	  through	  actions	  which	  are	  on	  the	  surface	  level	  socialist	  and	  inclusive.	  Finally,	  taxation	  and	  
rent-­‐seeking	  behaviour	  enabled	  al-­‐Shabaab	  to	  provide	  public	  works	  projects,	  such	  as	  restoring	  roads	  
and	  building	  bridges	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  In	  a	  bid	  to	  win	  public	  support,	  the	  group	  sought	  to	  provide	  the	  
services	  that	  would	  normally	  be	  provided	  by	  the	  state.	  The	  provision	  of	  such	  an	  extensive	  
governance	  system	  disputes	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  
implement	  rebel	  governance.	  This	  will	  be	  addressed	  further	  in	  the	  concluding	  section	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
	  
The	  regulation	  of	  foreign	  aid	  flows	  into	  al-­‐Shabaab-­‐controlled	  territory	  was	  another	  
mechanism	  used	  by	  the	  insurgents	  to	  portray	  itself	  as	  “protector	  of	  the	  people”	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  
Through	  the	  ‘Office	  for	  Supervising	  the	  Affairs	  of	  Foreign	  Agencies’	  and	  its	  subsidiary	  the	  
‘Humanitarian	  Coordination	  Office’,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  regulated	  the	  distribution	  of	  foreign	  aid,	  and	  in	  
many	  instances	  banned	  certain	  NGOs	  from	  operating	  in	  their	  territories	  (Jackson	  and	  Aynte,	  2013).	  
In	  doing	  so,	  they	  sought	  to	  challenge	  Western	  donors	  by	  accusing	  them	  of	  intentionally	  undermining	  
Somali	  farmers	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  The	  self-­‐proclaimed	  title	  of	  ‘Office	  for	  Supervising	  Affairs	  of	  Foreign	  
Agencies’	  provided	  al-­‐Shabaab	  with	  a	  form	  of	  superiority	  to	  international	  actors	  by	  enforcing	  the	  
perception	  that	  they	  had	  authority	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  international	  bodies	  within	  their	  territories	  
(Harnisch,	  2010;	  Zimmerman,	  2011a,	  2011b).	  Additionally,	  through	  the	  launch	  of	  their	  media	  branch,	  
the	  al	  Kata’ib	  Foundation	  for	  Media	  Production,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  took	  efforts	  to	  control	  the	  flow	  of	  
information	  out	  of	  their	  territories	  and	  influence	  public	  opinion,	  through	  the	  dissemination	  of	  
propaganda	  using	  news,	  statements,	  publications,	  and	  videos	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  also	  took	  




kidnappings,	  and	  assassinations	  were	  used	  to	  silence	  many	  independent	  journalists,	  subsequently	  
leaving	  al-­‐Shabaab	  outlets	  as	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  information	  for	  some	  localities	  (Mohamed,	  2009).	  
Whilst	  the	  regulation	  of	  information	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  media	  networks	  is	  not	  a	  primary	  
feature	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  the	  evidence	  that	  emerged	  from	  Somalia	  underscores	  the	  idea	  that	  al-­‐
Shabaab	  went	  to	  lengths	  to	  regulate	  and	  intervene	  in	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  Somali	  civilians.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  al-­‐Shabaab	  has	  not	  been	  preoccupied	  with	  establishing	  schools,	  it	  exerted	  
considerable	  influence	  over	  the	  education	  sector	  in	  southern	  Somalia.	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  issued	  a	  
statement	  in	  September	  2009	  warning	  schools	  from	  using	  textbooks	  provided	  by	  international	  
organisations	  that	  encouraged	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  un-­‐Islamic	  subjects	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  Human	  Rights	  
Watch	  (hereafter	  HRW)	  reported	  that	  al-­‐Shabaab’s	  implementation	  of	  their	  interpretation	  of	  Islam	  
prohibited	  English	  classes,	  science	  classes,	  and	  other	  subjects	  that	  they	  believed	  to	  be	  not	  conducive	  
with	  Islam	  (HRW,	  2012).	  Additionally,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  exerted	  their	  authority	  by	  segregating	  boys	  and	  
girls,	  as	  well	  as	  imposing	  a	  strict	  Islamic	  dress	  code	  (Harnisch,	  2010;	  HRW,	  2012).	  Recruitment	  to	  the	  
group	  often	  occurred	  within	  schools,	  particularly	  in	  the	  madrassas	  (Islamic	  schools),	  where	  children	  
were	  “indoctrinated”	  in	  radical	  interpretations	  of	  Islam	  and	  encouraged	  to	  join	  al-­‐Shabaab	  
(Harnisch,	  2010).	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  al-­‐Shabaab	  was	  concerned	  with	  regulating	  the	  daily	  lives	  of	  Somali	  
children	  and	  their	  intervention	  in	  the	  education	  sector	  is	  a	  primary	  indicator	  of	  the	  insurgent	  group’s	  
extensive	  governance	  system.	  	  
	  
The	  extensive	  application	  of	  sharia	  law	  by	  Islamic	  movements	  in	  southern	  Somalia	  appeared	  
to	  be	  a	  backlash	  to	  the	  secular	  tendency	  of	  the	  modern	  Somali	  state	  (Abdullahi,	  2014).	  Al-­‐Shabaab’s	  
strict	  interpretation	  of	  sharia	  law	  extended	  further	  than	  the	  education	  sector.	  Various	  types	  of	  
entertainment,	  including	  music	  and	  movies,	  were	  prohibited,	  as	  was	  smoking	  and	  the	  shaving	  of	  
beards	  (Masters	  and	  Sergie,	  2018).	  Harsh	  punishments	  for	  failing	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  group’s	  




as	  well	  as	  those	  who	  failed	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  mandatory	  five	  daily	  prayers	  (Harnisch,	  2010;	  
Masters	  and	  Sergie,	  2018).	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  used	  their	  interpretation	  of	  sharia	  law	  to	  control	  most	  
aspects	  of	  the	  personal	  lives	  of	  women	  and	  girls;	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  wear	  a	  veil,	  and	  reportedly	  
were	  prohibited	  from	  wearing	  bras	  (Harnisch,	  2010;	  HRW,	  2012).	  The	  implementation	  of	  the	  fierce	  
interpretation	  of	  sharia	  law	  followed	  by	  most	  people	  in	  southern	  Somalia	  demonstrated	  al-­‐
Shabaab’s	  complete	  control	  and	  authority	  over	  the	  area.	  	  
	  
Whilst	  they	  facilitated	  an	  extensive	  governance	  system	  across	  the	  territories	  it	  controls,	  al-­‐
Shabaab	  remained	  one	  of	  the	  principle	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  violence	  that	  has	  plagued	  southern	  
Somalia.	  Individual	  punishments	  for	  failing	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  strict	  interpretation	  of	  sharia	  law	  were	  
not	  uncommon.	  A	  religious	  police	  force,	  known	  as	  the	  Army	  of	  Hisbah,	  enforced	  the	  regulations	  and	  
apprehended	  those	  who	  failed	  to	  do	  so	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  Punishments	  were	  often	  carried	  out	  in	  
public,	  including	  the	  whipping	  of	  men	  who	  failed	  to	  maintain	  their	  beard	  and	  women	  who	  wore	  bras	  
(Sheikh,	  2009).	  Furthermore,	  reports	  of	  men	  and	  women	  being	  publicly	  stoned	  to	  death	  for	  adultery	  
emerged	  from	  various	  cities	  across	  southern	  Somalia,	  including	  a	  thirteen-­‐year-­‐old	  girl	  who	  was	  
reportedly	  a	  victim	  of	  rape	  (Anonymous,	  2009a).	  Additionally,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  carried	  out	  violent	  attacks	  
on	  its	  rivals	  through	  the	  use	  of	  improvised	  explosive	  devices	  (IEDs),	  assassinations,	  ambush-­‐style	  
attacks,	  and	  most	  notably,	  suicide	  bombings	  (Kimenyi,	  Mbaku,	  and	  Moyo,	  2010;	  Hansen,	  2012;	  Paul,	  
Clarke,	  and	  Serena,	  2014).	  Designated	  the	  deadliest	  terrorist	  organisation	  in	  Africa,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  
carried	  out	  a	  known	  216	  suicide	  attacks	  between	  2006	  and	  2017,	  killing	  an	  estimated	  595	  people	  
(Warner	  and	  Chapin,	  2018).	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  conducted	  highly	  targeted	  attacks	  against	  the	  TFG	  and	  its	  
supporters,	  Ethiopian,	  Kenyan,	  and	  Ugandan	  soldiers,	  personnel	  with	  the	  African	  Union	  Mission	  to	  
Somalia	  (AMISOM),	  and	  other	  pro-­‐government	  militias	  (Hansen,	  2012;	  Jones,	  2014).	  	  
	  
	   Al-­‐Shabaab	  is	  an	  interesting	  case	  study;	  the	  insurgent	  group	  implemented	  a	  well	  established	  




violent	  campaign	  against	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  alike.	  Al-­‐Shabaab’s	  primary	  motivate	  was	  
and	  is	  to	  establish	  an	  Islamic	  State	  in	  Somalia.	  In	  that	  respect,	  Al-­‐Shabaab’s	  insurgency	  is	  not	  
secessionist	  per	  se,	  however	  the	  state	  formation	  element	  may	  share	  similar	  attributes	  to	  the	  
secessionist	  insurgent	  nature.	  There	  is	  evidence,	  for	  example,	  that	  al-­‐Shabaab	  have	  attempted	  to	  
win	  the	  “hearts	  and	  minds”	  of	  the	  local	  populace,	  by	  providing	  for	  the	  poor	  (Harnisch,	  2010).	  The	  
case	  of	  al-­‐Shabaab	  raises	  questions	  about	  why	  insurgent	  groups	  implement	  systems	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  and	  challenges	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  establish	  
systems	  of	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups.	  
	  
6.1.4   Somali	  National	  Movement	  
In	  May	  1991,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  that	  conflict	  gripped	  southern	  Somalia,	  the	  Somali	  National	  
Movement	  (SNM)	  declared	  Somaliland,	  an	  area	  in	  northwestern	  Somalia,	  an	  independent	  state.	  
Whilst	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  SNM	  was	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Barre	  regime,	  the	  insurgency	  later	  
altered	  its	  course,	  declaring	  independence	  from	  federal	  Somalia	  (Bradbury,	  Abokor,	  and	  Yusuf,	  
2003).	  Those	  living	  within	  today’s	  Somaliland	  had	  long	  reasserted	  their	  desire	  to	  be	  the	  separate	  
entity	  it	  had	  been	  as	  the	  colony	  of	  British	  Somaliland	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  (Adam,	  1994;	  
Abdullahi,	  2014).	  The	  colonial	  history	  had	  helped	  foster	  a	  distinct	  sense	  of	  identity	  among	  Somalis	  in	  
the	  northwest	  (Adam,	  1994;	  Bryden,	  1999).	  Alongside	  their	  shared	  identity,	  intense	  state	  repression	  
in	  northern	  Somalia,	  which	  caused	  between	  50,000	  and	  100,000	  civilian	  casualties,	  militarised	  the	  
masses	  and	  had	  a	  unifying	  effect	  on	  the	  people	  (Hoehne,	  2009;	  Walls,	  2009;	  Ingiriis,	  2012;	  Johnson	  
and	  Smaker,	  2014).	  The	  declaration	  of	  independence	  for	  Somaliland	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  de	  facto	  
state	  administration	  in	  May	  1991	  occurred	  following	  the	  USC’s	  unilateral	  decision	  to	  form	  a	  
government.	  During	  the	  1980s,	  the	  SNM	  had	  fostered	  ties	  with	  a	  number	  of	  other	  insurgent	  groups,	  
including	  the	  USC	  who	  they	  had	  agreed	  specific	  terms	  with	  for	  the	  period	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  existing	  
Barre	  regime	  (Walls,	  2009).	  The	  ousting	  of	  Barre	  and	  the	  subsequent	  formation	  of	  a	  unilateral	  




as	  an	  independent	  state,	  a	  move	  that	  remains	  unrecognised	  by	  national	  and	  international	  entities	  
(Caplin,	  2009).	  	  
	  
The	  SNM	  insurgency’s	  success	  following	  independence	  has	  contributed	  to	  Somaliland	  
enjoying	  basic	  security,	  economic	  activity,	  and	  relative	  peace	  and	  order	  within	  its	  borders,	  a	  vivid	  
contrast	  to	  al-­‐Shabaab.	  Unlike	  Somalia,	  Somaliland	  is	  considered	  a	  functional	  state	  due	  to	  its	  
capacity	  to	  maintain	  some	  degree	  of	  public	  order	  and	  stability,	  as	  well	  as	  generating	  economic	  
recovery	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  The	  security	  sector	  in	  Somaliland	  is	  respected,	  effective,	  and	  
constrained;	  the	  government	  operates	  a	  seaport,	  an	  international	  airport,	  and	  a	  customs	  revenue	  
collection;	  the	  electoral	  boards	  have	  carried	  out	  multiple	  free	  and	  fair	  elections;	  and,	  the	  
government	  has	  succeeded	  in	  multiple	  constitutional	  transfers	  of	  power	  in	  their	  system	  of	  elected	  
representation	  (Hansen	  and	  Bradbury,	  2007;	  Menkhaus,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Politically,	  Somaliland	  is	  considered	  a	  relative	  success	  story	  in	  the	  ongoing	  Somali	  conflict;	  in	  
a	  drastic	  contrast	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  Somalia,	  it	  has	  escaped	  the	  turmoil	  that	  grips	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nation,	  
instead	  achieving	  self-­‐rule	  and	  stable	  democracy	  matched	  by	  few	  other	  countries	  in	  Africa	  and	  the	  
Middle	  East	  (Hansen	  and	  Bradbury,	  2007;	  Caplin,	  2009;	  Walls,	  2009).	  The	  bottom-­‐up	  process	  in	  
pursuing	  recognition	  as	  a	  sovereign	  state	  has	  not	  only	  had	  a	  unifying	  effect	  on	  its	  civilian	  population,	  
but	  it	  has	  also	  created	  the	  pressures	  for	  democratisation	  that	  have	  failed	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  
Somalia	  (Johnson	  and	  Smaker,	  2014).	  Somaliland	  has	  independently	  succeeded	  in	  creating	  a	  working	  
political	  system	  of	  elected	  representation;	  ten	  years	  after	  declaring	  independence,	  the	  SNM	  in	  
Somaliland	  introduced	  a	  new	  constitution	  by	  way	  of	  a	  national	  referendum	  and	  two	  years	  later,	  in	  
2003,	  the	  nation	  held	  its	  first	  open	  presidential	  elections.	  In	  2005,	  regular	  parliamentary	  elections	  
began,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  been	  declared	  free	  and	  fair	  by	  international	  observers	  (Hansen	  and	  
Bradbury,	  2007).	  Furthermore,	  cross-­‐clan	  votes	  have	  increased	  steadily,	  suggesting	  that	  policy,	  not	  




capable	  and	  durable	  government	  (Caplin,	  2009).	  Additionally,	  Somaliland	  has	  created	  its	  own	  army,	  
police	  force,	  a	  judiciary,	  and	  its	  own	  national	  currency	  (Bradbury,	  Abokor,	  and	  Yusuf,	  2003;	  Johnson	  
and	  Smaker,	  2014).	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  economic	  development,	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  that	  was	  
destroyed	  during	  the	  war	  has	  been	  restored	  and	  revived,	  particularly	  in	  Somaliland’s	  urban	  areas,	  its	  
municipal	  services,	  and	  its	  health	  and	  education	  sectors	  (Bradbury,	  Abokor,	  and	  Yusuf,	  2003).	  As	  
Somaliland	  is	  not	  recognised	  internationally,	  and	  consequently	  cannot	  access	  international	  loans,	  
the	  government	  of	  Somaliland	  has	  focused	  on	  generating	  revenue	  through	  the	  taxation	  of	  ports	  and	  
other	  trading	  hubs	  (Johnson	  and	  Smaker,	  2014).	  Without	  external	  assistance,	  reconstruction	  has	  
largely	  been	  achieved	  from	  the	  resources	  of	  Somalilanders	  themselves	  (Bradbury,	  Abokor,	  and	  
Yusuf,	  2003).	  	  
	  
The	  SNM	  insurgent	  group	  reinforce	  the	  theory	  that	  secessionist	  insurgencies	  are	  more	  likely	  
to	  implement	  effective	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  Somaliland’s	  quest	  for	  recognition	  and	  
legitimacy	  as	  an	  independent	  state	  provided	  the	  SNM	  with	  an	  incentive	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  they	  
are	  capable	  of	  implementing	  peace	  and	  stability,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  coherent	  governance	  structure.	  By	  
performing	  the	  functions	  of	  a	  state,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  security,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  basic	  social	  
services,	  and	  political	  services,	  the	  SNM	  have	  offered	  themselves	  as	  a	  credible	  alternative	  to	  the	  
faltering	  nation	  state	  of	  Somalia.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  SNM	  confirmed	  the	  expected	  outcome	  that	  a	  
secessionist	  insurgent	  group	  would	  implement	  rebel	  governance.	  
	  
6.2   Conclusion	  
	   	  Somalia	  is	  a	  unique	  case	  study;	  it	  is	  currently	  the	  longest-­‐standing	  “failed”	  state	  and	  it	  has	  
been	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  functioning	  government	  for	  nearly	  three	  decades	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  The	  




of	  statelessness,	  and	  clannism	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  Over	  the	  past	  decades,	  Somali	  political	  elites	  have	  
participated	  in	  a	  destructive	  form	  of	  politics,	  in	  which	  clan	  identity	  has	  been	  manipulated	  for	  
personal	  gain	  and	  short-­‐term	  profit-­‐making	  (Menkhaus,	  2014).	  As	  a	  result,	  numerous	  rebel	  groups	  
have	  emerged	  and	  evolved	  and	  recruited	  different	  levels	  of	  support.	  In	  this	  section	  I	  have	  looked	  at	  
attempts	  made	  by	  four	  insurgent	  groups	  who	  emerged	  from	  1991	  and	  attempted	  to	  fill	  the	  power	  
vacuum	  in	  Somalia.	  In	  each	  case,	  there	  was	  a	  different	  motivation	  and	  degree	  of	  planning	  which	  
impacted	  on	  their	  desire	  and	  ability	  to	  provide	  governance	  in	  Somalia.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  post-­‐Barre	  group	  discussed	  was	  the	  USC.	  An	  insurgency	  motivated	  by	  short-­‐term	  
power	  and	  control,	  they	  failed	  to	  provide	  an	  effective	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  part	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  
of	  planning	  but	  also	  their	  extreme	  use	  of	  violence	  against	  civilian	  populations.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  USC	  
supported	  my	  hypothesis	  (H1),	  as	  it	  was	  a	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgency	  I	  did	  not	  expect	  to	  see	  
evidence	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  ICU,	  a	  religiously-­‐motivated	  insurgent	  group,	  
implemented	  sharia	  courts	  and	  law	  across	  southern	  Somalia.	  Whilst	  the	  ICU’s	  system	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  was	  not	  as	  extensive	  and	  established	  as	  al-­‐Shabaab,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  they	  
implemented	  some	  form	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  ICU	  therefore	  contradicts	  the	  
hypothesis	  (H1),	  as	  it	  was	  a	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgency	  that	  used	  rebel	  governance	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
achieve	  their	  objective.	  
	  
A	  more	  successful	  governance	  scheme	  was	  implemented	  by	  al-­‐Shabaab.	  The	  group	  had	  a	  
long-­‐term	  plan,	  motivated	  by	  a	  zealous	  form	  of	  Sharia-­‐Islam.	  Their	  desire	  to	  implement	  a	  Muslim	  
state,	  rather	  than	  simply	  overthrow	  an	  existing	  group,	  meant	  they	  created	  a	  widespread	  system	  of	  
governance	  that	  encompassed	  much	  of	  southern	  Somalia.	  Among	  other	  things,	  Al-­‐Shabaab	  
implemented	  a	  judicial	  system,	  media	  entities,	  and	  school	  curriculums.	  This	  contradicts	  the	  theory	  




governance	  system,	  as	  they	  are	  not	  in	  pursuit	  of	  legitimacy,	  the	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  of	  the	  civilians,	  
and	  they	  are	  not	  fighting	  for	  a	  unified	  cause	  	  
	  
Similar	  to	  the	  ICU	  and	  al-­‐Shabaab	  in	  southern	  Somalia,	  the	  SNM	  implemented	  a	  broad,	  
seemingly	  successful	  form	  of	  governance.	  The	  comparison	  with	  al-­‐Shabaab	  is	  interesting	  as	  both	  
created	  functional	  forms	  of	  governance	  which	  were	  utilized	  by	  citizens,	  but	  their	  motivations	  were	  
completely	  different.	  The	  SNM	  emerged	  as	  a	  coherent	  unified	  entity,	  capable	  of	  creating	  lasting	  
governance	  structures	  that	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  relative	  peace	  and	  stability	  of	  northern	  Somalia,	  
in	  part	  thanks	  to	  their	  long-­‐term	  strategies.	  Seeking	  recognition	  as	  a	  legitimate	  independent	  state,	  
the	  SNM	  were	  incentivized	  to	  provide	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  order	  to	  portray	  to	  the	  
international	  community	  that	  they	  were	  capable	  of	  replicating	  state	  functions	  and	  operating	  as	  an	  
independent	  state	  entity.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  SNM	  supports	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  secessionist	  













7   A	  Case	  Study	  Analysis	  of	  Liberia	  (1989-­‐2003)	  
7.1   Introduction	  to	  Governance	  and	  Insurgency	  in	  Liberia	  
The	  general	  statelessness	  fuelled	  by	  violent	  internal	  conflict	  in	  Liberia	  provides	  an	  interesting	  
case	  study.	  By	  exploring	  the	  civil	  war	  history	  of	  modern	  Liberia,	  this	  case	  study	  brings	  to	  light	  how	  a	  
number	  of	  different	  insurgent	  groups	  emerged	  in	  response	  to	  the	  state’s	  inability	  or	  unwillingness	  to	  
provide	  governance	  to	  the	  Liberian	  population,	  and	  yet	  failed	  to	  fulfil	  this	  role	  themselves.	  In	  this	  
case	  study	  I	  will	  address	  the	  six	  main	  insurgent	  groups.	  I	  recognise	  in	  this	  case	  study	  that	  certain	  
sources	  are	  relied	  heavily	  upon,	  due	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  extensive	  research	  on	  some	  of	  the	  smaller	  
insurgent	  groups.	  Table	  3	  presents	  the	  six	  insurgent	  groups	  discussed	  in	  this	  section.	  As	  Table	  3	  
exhibits,	  the	  six	  insurgent	  groups	  possess	  common	  elements	  as	  they	  are	  all	  non-­‐secessionist,	  central	  
power	  grabbing	  insurgent	  groups.	  Utilising	  the	  theory	  established	  in	  Section	  3,	  I	  expect	  that	  there	  
will	  be	  little	  evidence	  of	  rebel	  governance	  from	  the	  six	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Liberian	  Rebel	  Groups	  in	  Order	  of	  Discussion	  
Insurgent	  Group	   Secessionist?	   Expected	  rebel	  
governance	  
Evidence	  of	  rebel	  
governance?	  
NPFL	   No	   No	   No	  
INPFL	   No	   No	   No	  
ULIMO	   No	   No	   No	  
LPC	   No	   No	   No	  
LURD	   No	   No	   No	  






7.2   First	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  (1989-­‐1997)	  
	   Triggered	  by	  the	  cross-­‐border	  Christmas	  Eve	  attack	  by	  the	  Taylor-­‐led	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  
of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	  into	  the	  border	  town	  of	  Butuo,	  Liberia	  was	  plunged	  into	  what	  would	  become	  one	  of	  
Africa’s	  most	  brutal	  and	  violent	  civil	  wars	  (Ellis,	  1995).	  Whilst	  civil	  war	  did	  not	  erupt	  until	  1989,	  the	  
preconditions	  for	  state	  collapse	  and	  civil	  war	  long	  preceded	  Taylor’s	  invasion.	  Firstly,	  increasing	  state	  
decay	  and	  institutional	  failure	  under	  the	  Doe	  government	  and	  his	  predecessor,	  President	  William	  
Tolbert	  (1971-­‐80),	  had	  weakened	  the	  Liberian	  bureaucratic	  system	  as	  a	  means	  of	  manipulating	  and	  
expanding	  the	  patronage	  network	  that	  sought	  to	  benefit	  a	  very	  small	  elite	  group	  (McDonough,	  
2008).	  Second,	  high	  unemployment,	  the	  state’s	  inability	  to	  pay	  government	  workers	  regularly,	  and	  
the	  state’s	  failure	  to	  provide	  basic	  social	  services	  fuelled	  a	  growing	  resistance	  to	  Doe’s	  government	  
(Harris,	  1999;	  Kieh,	  2004).	  Third,	  the	  rigged	  1985	  national	  election,	  which	  by	  all	  independent	  
accounts	  Doe	  and	  his	  National	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Liberia	  (NDPL)	  had	  lost,	  and	  the	  following	  
repression	  and	  purging	  of	  real	  and	  imagined	  enemies	  gave	  rise	  to	  mass	  disenchantment	  (Sesay,	  
1996;	  Boas,	  2001;	  Kieh,	  2004).	  The	  resulting	  civil	  war,	  therefore,	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  a	  long	  chain	  
of	  events	  aimed	  at	  replacing	  the	  old	  political	  establishment	  with	  a	  new	  order	  (Sesay,	  1996).	  	  
	  
	   A	  number	  of	  rebel	  groups	  emerged	  in	  the	  first	  civil	  war;	  the	  Taylor-­‐led	  NPFL	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
offshoots,	  including	  the	  Independent	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (INPFL),	  the	  United	  
Liberation	  Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (ULIMO)	  which	  later	  split	  into	  two	  factions	  known	  as	  
ULIMO-­‐K	  and	  ULIMO-­‐J,	  and	  the	  Liberian	  Peace	  Council	  (LPC).	  Whilst	  most	  evidently	  embodied	  by	  the	  
actions	  of	  Taylor,	  the	  warlord	  pursuit	  of	  commerce	  was	  evident	  by	  each	  faction	  (Reno,	  1999).	  Whilst	  
insurgent	  actions	  during	  the	  first	  civil	  war	  are	  often	  interpreted	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  ethnicity,	  the	  
war	  was	  predominantly	  characterised	  by	  struggles	  between	  contending	  warlords	  (Riley,	  1997;	  Cliffe	  
and	  Luckham,	  1999).	  Brutal	  military	  means,	  often	  perpetrated	  by	  unpaid	  soldiers	  who	  took	  
advantage	  of	  the	  chaos	  for	  personal	  gain,	  were	  used	  to	  pursue	  commerce,	  resources,	  and	  in	  most	  




aforementioned	  insurgent	  groups.	  By	  identifying	  their	  motivations,	  wartime	  techniques,	  and	  any	  
elements	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  I	  am	  able	  to	  address	  the	  hypothesis	  laid	  out	  in	  Section	  3.	  I	  expect	  to	  
find	  that	  the	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  emerged	  in	  Liberia’s	  first	  civil	  war	  did	  not	  pursue	  
systems	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  	  	  
	  
7.2.1   The	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (NPFL)	  
	   The	  dominant	  insurgent	  group,	  the	  NPFL,	  emerged	  from	  a	  collection	  of	  exiles	  -­‐	  a	  result	  of	  
purges	  by	  the	  Doe	  regime	  -­‐	  who	  had	  little	  in	  common	  apart	  from	  a	  strong	  aversion	  to	  President	  Doe	  
(Johnston,	  2008).	  Taylor,	  for	  example,	  had	  been	  a	  ranking	  official	  in	  Doe’s	  government	  who	  had	  fled	  
Liberia	  in	  1983	  amid	  charges	  of	  embezzlement.	  Through	  a	  combination	  of	  bribes	  and	  assassinations	  
of	  potential	  rivals,	  Taylor	  installed	  himself	  as	  head	  of	  the	  NPFL	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  Taylor	  led	  the	  December	  
24th	  1989	  cross-­‐border	  attack	  with	  as	  little	  as	  fifty	  men	  (Reno,	  1997).	  Within	  months	  of	  the	  ensuing	  
civil	  war,	  the	  Taylor-­‐led	  NPFL	  numbered	  more	  than	  5,000	  combatants,	  and	  they	  had	  taken	  control	  of	  
an	  increasing	  amount	  of	  territory	  (Boas,	  2001).	  Made	  possible	  by	  mass	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  Doe	  
government,	  the	  NPFL	  successfully	  took	  control	  of	  around	  ninety	  percent	  of	  Liberia	  within	  three	  
months	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  As	  previously	  mentioned,	  the	  Doe	  government	  had	  become	  so	  illegitimate	  that	  
most	  Liberians	  were	  prepared	  to	  support	  any	  kind	  of	  change	  (Harris,	  1999;	  Kieh,	  2004).	  	  	  
	  
Whilst	  ethnicity	  was	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  obtaining	  resources,	  mobilisation,	  and	  recruitment,	  it	  
was	  clear	  that	  the	  real	  agenda	  of	  the	  NPFL	  was	  to	  overthrow	  the	  Doe	  government,	  implement	  Taylor	  
as	  president,	  and	  use	  Liberia’s	  natural	  resources	  for	  personal	  wealth	  and	  gain	  (Kieh,	  2004;	  Jackson,	  
2011).	  Liberia’s	  immense	  illiteracy	  problem,	  which	  at	  some	  estimates	  was	  at	  eighty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  
the	  population	  –	  made	  the	  population	  especially	  vulnerable	  to	  manipulation	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  This	  was	  
predominant	  at	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  war,	  as	  initially	  the	  Gio	  and	  Mano	  ethnic	  groups	  dominated	  the	  
NPFL	  ranks,	  whilst	  Doe’s	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Liberia	  (AFL)	  predominantly	  consisted	  of	  the	  Krahn	  and	  




divisions	  were	  initially	  utilised	  to	  drive	  recruitment,	  foster	  support	  and	  as	  a	  pretext	  for	  the	  targeting	  
of	  civilians,	  however	  the	  NPFL	  quickly	  attracted	  a	  multi-­‐ethnic	  support	  base	  generated	  by	  a	  shared-­‐
resentment	  of	  the	  neo-­‐patrimonial	  Doe	  regime	  (Harris,	  1999;	  Boas,	  2001).	  The	  NPFL	  itself,	  however,	  
was	  not	  formed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  ethnicity.	  Instead,	  it	  was	  an	  center-­‐seeking	  insurgency	  formed	  to	  
overthrow	  the	  government	  and	  take	  power	  for	  themselves	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  	  
	  
	   The	  wartime	  practices	  of	  the	  NPFL	  insurgency	  was	  marred	  with	  brutality	  and	  grievous	  
human	  rights	  violations	  against	  the	  local	  populace.	  A	  witness	  to	  the	  violence	  branded	  the	  Liberian	  
civil	  war	  as	  surpassing	  all	  other	  wars	  “in	  intensity,	  in	  depravity,	  in	  savagery,	  in	  barbarism	  and	  in	  
horror”	  (Ellis,	  1995).	  The	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  disarmament	  generated	  an	  abundance	  of	  cheap	  weapons	  
that	  became	  increasingly	  accessible	  to	  insurgents	  (Reno,	  1995).	  With	  the	  availability	  of	  weapons,	  
and	  with	  no	  discernible	  security	  sector	  in	  Liberia,	  civilians	  were	  at	  the	  mercy	  of	  insurgents,	  who	  one	  
witness	  described	  as	  becoming	  “addicted	  to	  blood	  and	  violence”	  (Reno,	  1995).	  Under	  what	  became	  
known	  as	  “Operation	  Pay	  Yourself”,	  NPFL	  insurgents	  were	  given	  formal	  permission	  from	  Taylor	  to	  
engage	  in	  looting	  and	  plundering	  as	  their	  form	  of	  payment	  (Johnston,	  2008).	  Not	  only	  did	  NPFL	  
combatants	  loot,	  pillage,	  and	  deliberately	  destroy	  infrastructure,	  they	  initiated	  a	  violent	  
unrestrained	  campaign	  against	  Liberian	  civilians,	  raping,	  maiming,	  and	  killing	  indiscriminately	  (Cain,	  
1999;	  McGovern,	  2005).	  	  
	  
	   The	  prominence	  of	  child	  soldiers	  used	  by	  the	  NPFL,	  both	  voluntary	  and	  forced,	  indicated	  
how	  little	  regard	  the	  NPFL	  had	  for	  gathering	  public	  support	  through	  any	  means	  but	  violence	  and	  
economic	  incentives.	  The	  abundance	  of	  voluntary	  child	  recruits	  stemmed	  from	  the	  increasingly	  large	  
number	  of	  orphaned,	  abandoned,	  homeless,	  and	  hungry	  children,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  thrust	  into	  
self-­‐dependency	  and	  joined	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  power,	  protection,	  and	  economic	  opportunity	  (Human	  
Rights	  Watch,	  1994b;	  Murphy	  2003;	  Woodward	  and	  Galvin,	  2009).	  Whilst	  some	  voluntarily	  joined	  




recruited	  into	  the	  rebel	  movement	  or	  into	  domestic	  and	  sexual	  servitude	  (Murphy,	  2003;	  McGovern,	  
2005;	  Boas,	  2009).	  What	  resulted	  was	  an	  abundance	  of	  unpaid,	  traumatised	  youths	  –	  some	  
estimates	  put	  figures	  at	  10,000	  child	  soldiers	  under	  the	  age	  of	  fifteen	  -­‐	  resorting	  to	  looting	  and	  terror	  
(Human	  Rights	  Watch,	  1994b;	  Riley,	  1997;	  Harris,	  1999).	  The	  willingness	  of	  the	  NPFL	  to	  use	  such	  a	  
large	  number	  of	  children	  as	  combatants	  indicated	  that	  there	  were	  willing	  to	  resort	  to	  any	  tactic,	  
regardless	  of	  the	  brutality,	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  their	  power-­‐grabbing	  goal	  and	  economic	  
accumulation.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  NPFL	  saw	  no	  need	  to	  win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  Liberian	  
people.	  	  
	  
Similar	  to	  its	  recruitment	  tactics,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Taylor	  and	  the	  NPFL	  saw	  little	  need	  to	  
implement	  a	  system	  of	  governance	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  resources	  from	  civilians.	  This	  is	  exemplified	  in	  
the	  establishment	  of	  his	  commercial	  empire,	  encompassing	  most	  of	  Liberia	  and	  parts	  of	  Guinea	  and	  
Sierra	  Leone,	  which	  he	  proclaimed	  as	  “Taylorland”	  (Harris,	  1999).	  Gbarnga,	  Taylorland’s	  proclaimed	  
capital	  city,	  became	  the	  seat	  of	  Taylor’s	  National	  Patriotic	  Reconstruction	  Assembly	  Government.	  
Within	  Gbarnga,	  Taylor	  established	  ministries,	  banks,	  and	  his	  own	  currency	  (Harris,	  1999;	  Ellis,	  
1995).	  Furthermore,	  Taylorland	  boasted	  an	  international	  airport	  and	  a	  deep	  water	  port,	  allowing	  
export	  trade	  to	  boom	  (Harris,	  1999).	  Taylor’s	  freedom	  from	  creditors	  (as	  he	  was	  not	  the	  
internationally	  recognised	  sovereign)	  allowed	  him	  to	  successfully	  exploit	  Liberia’s	  abundance	  of	  
natural	  resources,	  particularly	  timber,	  for	  personal	  wealth,	  capital,	  and	  weapons	  (Reno,	  1995;	  
Johnston,	  2004).	  Shady	  foreign	  firms	  were	  attracted	  to	  Liberia	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  extracting	  primary	  
commodities	  and	  participating	  in	  the	  burgeoning	  wartime	  weapons	  trade	  (Johnston,	  2004).	  Timber	  
was	  the	  largest	  sector	  of	  Taylor’s	  export	  economy	  and	  provided	  a	  crucial	  source	  of	  income	  in	  
sustaining	  his	  dominance	  (Johnston,	  2004).	  By	  1991,	  Taylorland,	  under	  NPFL	  control,	  had	  become	  
France’s	  third	  largest	  source	  of	  tropical	  hardwood	  (Reno,	  1995).	  Income	  from	  this	  lucrative	  business	  
enabled	  Taylor	  and	  the	  NPFL	  to	  almost	  entirely	  control	  their	  political	  networks	  through	  private	  




little	  need	  to	  implement	  a	  governing	  system.	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  the	  NPFL	  did	  not	  preoccupy	  
themselves	  with	  formulating	  a	  rebel	  governance	  system.	  The	  ministries	  and	  banks	  that	  were	  
implemented	  were	  done	  so	  purely	  for	  the	  personal	  benefit	  of	  Taylor	  and	  specific	  NPFL	  elites,	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  Liberian	  population	  (Jackson,	  2011).	  	  
	  
To	  conclude,	  any	  kind	  of	  ‘governance’	  structure	  Taylor	  and	  the	  NPFL	  established	  was	  in	  order	  to	  
consolidate	  their	  own	  power	  and	  to	  produce	  funds	  through	  exports	  that	  would	  be	  used	  for	  personal	  
gain.	  Instead,	  the	  NPFL	  was	  a	  violent	  insurgency	  that	  saw	  little	  need	  to	  please	  the	  civilians	  in	  
exchange	  for	  support.	  Whilst	  some	  Liberians	  joined	  out	  of	  fear	  or	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  
opportunities,	  others	  were	  forced	  into	  participating.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  NPFL,	  a	  non-­‐secessionist	  
insurgent	  group,	  supports	  my	  hypothesis.	  From	  my	  theoretical	  outline	  established	  in	  Section	  3,	  I	  had	  
no	  expectation	  that	  a	  group	  motivated	  by	  power	  and	  economic	  gains	  would	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  
rebel	  governance.	  	  
	  
7.2.2   The	  Independent	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (INPFL)	  
	   As	  a	  splinter	  group	  of	  the	  NPFL,	  the	  Independent	  National	  Patriotic	  Front	  of	  Liberia	  (INPFL),	  
shared	  similar	  goals	  of	  overthrowing	  the	  Doe	  regime	  and	  seizing	  power	  (Johnston,	  2008;	  Kieh,	  2004).	  
Organised	  and	  led	  by	  one	  of	  Taylor’s	  confidantes,	  Prince	  Yeduo	  Johnson	  split	  from	  the	  NPFL	  claiming	  
that	  Taylor	  would	  not	  make	  a	  good	  leader	  for	  Liberia	  (Boas,	  2001).	  Unlike	  the	  other	  warlords	  
involved	  in	  the	  first	  civil	  war,	  Johnson	  was	  less	  occupied	  with	  the	  acquisition	  of	  wealth.	  Instead,	  the	  
INPFL	  consisted	  of	  a	  number	  of	  Taylor’s	  lieutenants	  who	  had	  been	  angered	  by	  Taylor’s	  penchant	  for	  
selling	  Liberia’s	  resources	  for	  personal	  gain	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  Overthrowing	  the	  Doe	  regime	  and	  the	  
acquisition	  of	  power	  were	  the	  INPFL’s	  primary	  concerns,	  thus	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  as	  a	  non-­‐





	   It	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  violent	  way	  that	  the	  INPFL	  conducted	  their	  wartime	  practices	  that	  they	  saw	  
little	  need	  to	  develope	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance	  to	  win	  support	  or	  resources.	  Like	  the	  NPFL,	  the	  
INPFL	  committed	  its	  fair	  share	  of	  atrocities	  against	  the	  civilian	  population	  (Kieh,	  2004).	  In	  their	  bid	  to	  
capture	  territory	  from	  the	  NPFL,	  particularly	  the	  capital	  city,	  Monrovia,	  the	  INPFL	  utilised	  strictly	  
military	  techniques	  (Boas,	  2001).	  The	  superior	  military	  capability	  of	  the	  INPFL	  allowed	  the	  insurgent	  
group	  to	  control	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  country	  previously	  held	  by	  Taylor’s	  NPFL	  (Duyvesteyn,	  2005).	  The	  
violent	  nature	  of	  the	  INPFL	  was	  exemplified	  in	  the	  capture,	  torture,	  and	  death	  of	  President	  Doe	  at	  
the	  hands	  of	  INPFL	  insurgents	  in	  September	  1990,	  and	  the	  wide	  circulation	  of	  the	  video	  of	  his	  death	  
is	  a	  reminder	  of	  the	  INPFL’s	  violence	  (Harris,	  1999).	  The	  INPFL’s	  goal	  was	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  Doe	  
regime,	  take	  territorial	  control,	  and	  seize	  power.	  There	  is	  no	  evidence	  that	  the	  INPFL	  pursued	  these	  
goals	  through	  any	  means	  other	  than	  violence	  and	  military	  techniques.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  INPFL	  
supports	  my	  hypothesis,	  as	  they	  were	  a	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  group	  who	  did	  not	  pursue	  any	  
system	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  	  
	  
7.2.3   The	  United	  Liberation	  Movement	  of	  Liberia	  for	  Democracy	  (ULIMO)	  
	   Whilst	  ULIMO	  quickly	  divided	  into	  militia	  factions	  (ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K)	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
internal	  divisions,	  power	  struggles,	  and	  ethnic	  tensions,	  I	  will	  be	  discussing	  the	  groups	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  each	  other.	  Current	  research	  shows	  that	  they	  had	  very	  similar	  approaches	  to	  governance	  and	  
the	  shared	  aim	  of	  seizing	  power	  (Ellis,	  1995;	  Kieh,	  2009).	  Emerging	  in	  response	  to	  Doe’s	  capture	  and	  
killing,	  and	  consisting	  predominantly	  of	  the	  former	  officials	  of	  the	  Doe	  regime,	  both	  ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  
ULIMO-­‐K	  wanted	  to	  prevent	  Taylor	  and	  the	  NPFL	  ascending	  to	  the	  presidency.	  Due	  to	  the	  non-­‐
secessionist	  goal	  of	  central-­‐power	  seeking	  of	  ULIMO-­‐K	  and	  ULIMO-­‐J,	  I	  expect	  that	  they	  did	  not	  
implement	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  instead	  relying	  on	  other	  means	  to	  pursue	  their	  goals.	  The	  





	   Similar	  to	  the	  NPFL	  and	  INPFL,	  the	  two	  militias,	  ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K,	  used	  similar	  fighting	  
techniques,	  relying	  heavily	  on	  military	  capabilities	  to	  conduct	  territorial	  raids	  in	  the	  search	  of	  bounty	  
and	  resources	  (Ellis,	  1995;	  Kieh,	  2009).	  The	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  (2003b)	  reported	  that	  ULIMO-­‐
K,	  in	  particular,	  was	  particularly	  notorious	  for	  its	  use	  of	  violence,	  labelling	  the	  militia	  as	  responsible	  
for	  some	  of	  the	  heaviest	  looting	  and	  committing	  some	  of	  the	  worst	  atrocities	  in	  the	  first	  Liberian	  civil	  
war.	  Victims	  of	  ULIMO-­‐K	  raids	  reported	  that	  a	  common	  tactic	  was	  to	  kidnap	  women	  and	  threaten	  to	  
kill	  them	  unless	  their	  husbands	  paid	  ransom	  money	  (Ellis,	  1995).	  As	  with	  the	  NPFL	  and	  INPFL,	  both	  
ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K	  enjoyed	  military	  success	  in	  gaining	  important	  territories,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
diamond-­‐rich	  region	  of	  western	  Liberia	  (Harris,	  1999).	  Additionally,	  reports	  show	  that	  ULIMO-­‐J	  was	  
able	  to	  take	  control	  of	  some	  of	  Liberia’s	  strategically	  important	  ports,	  which	  was	  a	  useful	  source	  of	  
revenue	  for	  the	  group	  (Ellis,	  1995).	  ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K	  were	  supported	  by	  external	  actors,	  the	  
former	  by	  Sierra	  Leone	  and	  the	  latter	  by	  Guinea,	  both	  of	  whom	  wanted	  to	  pressurise	  Taylor	  militarily	  
and	  prevent	  his	  ascension	  to	  power	  (Jaye,	  2003).	  Whilst	  evidence	  regarding	  ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K	  is	  
not	  expansive,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  both	  insurgent	  groups	  joined	  the	  other	  warring	  factions	  in	  their	  use	  
of	  violent	  military	  techniques	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  power-­‐seeking	  goals.	  As	  expected,	  there	  is	  little	  
evidence	  indicating	  that	  ULIMO-­‐J	  and	  ULIMO-­‐K	  implemented	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  	  
	  
7.2.4   The	  Liberia	  Peace	  Council	  (LPC)	  
	   Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  former	  government	  minister,	  George	  Boley,	  the	  Liberia	  Peace	  
Council	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  dissolution	  of	  the	  Doe	  regime	  following	  his	  murder	  (Boas,	  2001).	  The	  
LPC	  attempted	  to	  appeal	  to	  the	  youth	  of	  various	  ethnic	  groups	  through	  a	  campaign	  of	  “cut[ting]	  the	  
Big	  Men	  down	  to	  size”	  (Reno,	  1997).	  They	  utilized	  civilians	  distaste	  towards	  Taylor	  and	  the	  NPFL	  by	  
appearing	  as	  the	  insurgent	  group	  who	  wanted	  to	  hinder	  Taylor’s	  power-­‐grabbing	  goals,	  however	  it	  is	  
evident	  that	  the	  leaders	  wanted	  to	  regain	  the	  political	  power	  they	  had	  under	  the	  Doe	  regime	  and	  to	  





Like	  both	  ULIMO	  factions,	  the	  LPC	  was	  supported	  by	  external	  actors,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  Nigerian	  
peacekeeping	  force,	  who	  saw	  him	  as	  a	  proxy	  to	  stem	  Taylor’s	  power	  (Reno,	  1997).	  As	  well	  as	  
receiving	  external	  support,	  the	  LPC	  vied	  for	  control	  of	  Liberia’s	  natural	  resources	  with	  the	  NPFL.	  One	  
report	  from	  Liberia	  claimed	  that	  the	  insurgent	  group	  took	  control	  of	  the	  formerly	  American-­‐run	  
Liberia	  Agriculture	  Company	  rubber	  plantation	  and	  were	  using	  6,000	  LPC	  captives	  to	  work	  at	  the	  
plantation,	  generating	  substantial	  export	  revenue	  (Reno,	  1997).	  Furthermore,	  Adebajo	  (1996)	  
reported	  that	  it	  was	  not	  uncommon	  for	  LPC	  militias	  to	  block	  aid	  convoys	  and	  seize	  the	  peacekeepers’	  
weapons	  and	  supplies.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  LPC	  did	  not	  need	  the	  financial	  support	  of	  
the	  Liberian	  civilians.	  It	  is	  unsurprising,	  therefore,	  that	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  emerged	  in	  the	  LPC-­‐held	  territories.	  
	  
As	  with	  all	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  insurgent	  groups	  involved	  in	  Liberia’s	  first	  civil	  war,	  the	  
LPC	  were	  a	  brutal	  group	  who	  used	  violence	  to	  further	  their	  goals.	  The	  harassment	  and	  killing	  of	  
civilians	  was	  rife	  among	  LPC	  fighters.	  A	  report	  by	  Human	  Rights	  Watch	  (1994a)	  outlined	  the	  
systematic	  targeting	  of	  civilians,	  especially	  those	  who	  had	  lived	  in	  previously	  NPFL-­‐held	  areas	  despite	  
their	  affiliation.	  Survivors	  of	  LPC	  attacks	  reported	  being	  tortured,	  beaten,	  and	  branded	  (HRW,	  1994a;	  
Kieh,	  2004).	  Furthermore,	  the	  brutality	  of	  LPC	  tactics	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  displacement	  of	  
thousands	  of	  women,	  children,	  and	  the	  elderly,	  with	  one	  report	  estimating	  that	  there	  were	  40,000	  
civilians	  displaced	  in	  the	  city	  of	  Buchanan	  alone	  (HRW,	  1994a).	  Able-­‐bodied	  men	  were	  either	  
arrested,	  forcibly	  recruited,	  or	  incarcerated	  (HRW,	  1994a).	  The	  extreme	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  
LPC	  underline	  that	  implementing	  a	  governance	  structure	  was	  not	  on	  their	  political	  agenda.	  Instead,	  
violent	  military	  means	  and	  the	  systematic	  targeting	  of	  civilians	  was	  used	  to	  further	  their	  goals.	  This	  
supports	  the	  theory	  established	  in	  Section	  3,	  as	  the	  LPC	  were	  a	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  group	  
who	  did	  not	  require	  civilian	  support	  or	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy.	  




7.3   The	  Second	  Liberian	  Civil	  War	  	  
	   Civil	  conflict	  within	  Liberia	  reignited	  following	  a	  brief	  interlude	  from	  1997	  to	  1999.	  After	  to	  
failing	  to	  win	  the	  first	  civil	  war	  militarily,	  Charles	  Taylor	  had	  come	  to	  assume	  power	  through	  a	  
presidential	  election	  in	  1997.	  The	  resurgence	  of	  conflict	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  a	  number	  of	  factors.	  
Firstly,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  post-­‐civil	  war	  transitional	  processes,	  such	  as	  the	  disarmament,	  
demobilization,	  and	  rehabilitation	  of	  former	  combatants	  into	  society	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  Insufficient	  
logistical	  preparations	  hampered	  demobilization	  centers,	  there	  was	  no	  civic	  education,	  and	  many	  of	  
the	  weapons	  collected	  were	  either	  in	  poor	  condition	  or	  unserviceable	  (Tanner,	  1998).	  Furthermore,	  
those	  who	  joined	  the	  demobilization	  exercises	  tended	  to	  be	  the	  weaker	  combatants,	  whilst	  the	  
hardened	  more	  loyal	  insurgents	  avoided	  participating	  (Tanner,	  1998).	  Additionally,	  due	  to	  the	  brutal	  
nature	  of	  the	  first	  civil	  war,	  a	  number	  of	  insurgents	  required	  professional	  psychological	  services	  in	  
order	  to	  prepare	  them	  for	  re-­‐integration	  into	  wider	  society	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  The	  lack	  of	  assistance	  in	  
rehabilitating	  and	  re-­‐integrating	  insurgents	  left	  many	  combatants	  unemployed	  and	  uneducated,	  
leaving	  many	  of	  them	  susceptible	  to	  returning	  to	  combat	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  economic	  opportunities	  
(Kieh,	  2009).	  There	  was	  little	  to	  no	  assistance	  in	  integrating	  former	  combatants	  back	  into	  society	  and	  
no	  community-­‐based	  reconciliation	  programs	  existed	  involving	  former	  combatants	  and	  non-­‐
combatants	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  The	  second	  factor	  for	  the	  resurgence	  of	  civil	  conflict	  was	  the	  failure,	  or	  
refusal,	  of	  Taylor’s	  government	  to	  address	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  the	  first	  civil	  war	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  
The	  failure	  to	  tackle	  the	  chronic	  social	  and	  economic	  problems	  across	  Liberia	  meant	  that	  many	  were	  
dissatisfied	  with	  Taylor’s	  rule.	  The	  neglect	  of	  Liberia’s	  lower	  classes	  contributed	  to	  continued	  
repression,	  poverty,	  and	  discontent	  thrived	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  The	  following	  section	  will	  address	  the	  two	  
most	  prominent	  insurgent	  groups	  of	  the	  second	  Liberian	  civil	  war,	  Liberians	  United	  for	  Reconciliation	  
and	  Democracy	  (LURD)	  and	  Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (MODEL).	  Both	  LURD	  and	  MODEL	  
were	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups,	  motivated	  by	  overthrowing	  the	  Taylor	  regime	  and	  ascending	  to	  




little	  evidence	  of	  rebel	  governance	  due	  to	  the	  prominence	  of	  violent	  military	  capabilities	  as	  a	  means	  
to	  achieve	  their	  power-­‐grabbing	  goals.	  
	  
7.3.1   Liberians	  United	  for	  Reconciliation	  and	  Democracy	  (LURD)	  
Similar	  to	  the	  first	  phase	  of	  civil	  war,	  the	  second	  phase	  of	  the	  Liberian	  civil	  war	  arose	  as	  a	  
result	  of	  discontent	  towards	  the	  sitting	  president	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  Rebels	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  Liberians	  
United	  for	  Reconciliation	  and	  Democracy	  (LURD)	  emerged	  in	  1999	  with	  the	  catchphrase	  ‘Taylor	  must	  
go’,	  with	  the	  motive	  of	  removing	  Taylor	  from	  not	  only	  the	  presidency,	  but	  the	  country	  (Kaihko,	  
2015).	  Comparable	  to	  the	  initial	  formation	  of	  the	  NPFL,	  LURD	  insurgents	  were	  bonded	  together	  by	  a	  
shared	  resentment	  towards	  a	  common	  enemy	  (Kaihko,	  2015).	  Whilst	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  LURD	  was	  a	  
more	  cohesive,	  albeit	  decentralised,	  organisation	  with	  a	  better	  thought-­‐out	  strategy	  than	  previous	  
insurgent	  groups	  in	  Liberia,	  there	  was	  little	  agreement	  on	  what	  would	  follow	  after	  they	  had	  achieved	  
their	  initial	  goal	  of	  deposing	  Taylor	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2003a;	  Johnston,	  2008;	  Kaihko,	  2015).	  
Moreover,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  LURD	  was	  more	  concerned	  with	  public	  perception	  and	  support	  (Kaihko,	  
2015).	  It	  remains,	  however,	  that	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  LURD	  occupied	  themselves	  with	  
developing	  any	  system	  of	  governance.	  	  
	  
LURD	  was	  a	  descendent	  from	  the	  defunct	  ULIMO-­‐K,	  who,	  as	  previously	  mentioned,	  had	  an	  
appalling	  human	  rights	  record	  in	  western	  Liberia	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2003b).	  Because	  of	  this,	  
LURD	  had	  to	  overcome	  a	  level	  of	  distrust	  among	  the	  Liberian	  population.	  Initially,	  LURD	  went	  to	  
lengths	  to	  avoid	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  the	  indiscriminate	  targeting	  of	  civilians	  (International	  
Crisis	  Group,	  2002).	  Throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  war,	  however,	  LURD	  increasingly	  resulted	  to	  
violent	  means	  to	  in	  pursuit	  of	  their	  power-­‐grabbing	  goal.	  A	  report	  by	  the	  International	  Crisis	  Group	  
(2002)	  detailed	  one	  example	  where	  LURD	  rebels	  attacked	  a	  refugee	  camp	  and	  took	  hostage	  five	  




Monrovia	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  capture	  the	  strategically	  important	  presidential	  Executive	  Mansion,	  there	  
were	  reports	  of	  LURD	  bombing	  non-­‐combatants	  (ICG,	  2003b;	  Kaihko,	  2015).	  	  
	   	  
Whilst	  reports	  suggest	  that	  LURD	  was	  considerably	  less	  violent	  in	  its	  interaction	  with	  civilians	  
compared	  to	  its	  predecessors	  in	  the	  first	  Liberian	  civil	  war,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  that	  LURD	  
attempted	  to	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  They	  had	  a	  more	  thought-­‐out	  strategy	  than	  
the	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  the	  first	  civil	  war,	  however	  this	  strategy	  appeared	  to	  go	  no	  further	  than	  
disposing	  of	  Taylor	  and	  seizing	  power	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2003a;	  Keihko,	  2015).	  
	  
7.3.2   Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (MODEL)	  
	   The	  Movement	  for	  Democracy	  in	  Liberia	  (MODEL)	  was	  the	  smallest	  of	  the	  major	  warring	  
factions	  in	  the	  second	  Liberian	  civil	  war.	  Whilst	  LURD	  descended	  from	  ULIMO-­‐K,	  MODEL	  emerged	  as	  
a	  descendent	  of	  the	  ULIMO-­‐J	  militia	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2003b).	  As	  has	  been	  the	  case	  
throughout	  this	  case	  study,	  MODEL	  was	  a	  central	  power-­‐seeking	  insurgent	  group,	  motivated	  by	  
overthrowing	  the	  Taylor	  regime	  and	  ascending	  to	  power	  (Kieh,	  2009).	  As	  prior	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  
the	  Liberian	  case	  study	  have	  shown,	  I	  expect	  that	  MODEL	  did	  not	  implement	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  in	  the	  areas	  under	  their	  control.	  
	  
MODEL’s	  success	  in	  rapidly	  taking	  control	  of	  much	  of	  southeastern	  Liberia	  was	  accredited	  to	  
the	  major	  support	  from	  the	  Côte	  d’Ivoire,	  whose	  president,	  Laurent	  Gbagbo,	  wanted	  to	  see	  Taylor	  
removed	  from	  power	  (International	  Crisis	  Group,	  2003b;	  Kieh,	  2004).	  A	  report	  by	  the	  International	  
Crisis	  Group	  (2003b)	  detailed	  the	  support,	  outlining	  that	  MODEL	  insurgents	  were	  heavily	  supplied	  by	  
Ivorian	  uniform,	  weaponry,	  and	  funding.	  Recruitment	  was	  also	  driven	  from	  the	  Côte	  d’Ivoire,	  where	  
a	  number	  of	  displaced	  Liberian	  refugees	  had	  settled	  following	  the	  violence	  of	  the	  first	  civil	  war	  




displaced	  refugees	  indicated	  that	  MODEL	  had	  no	  need	  to	  implement	  a	  governance	  system	  to	  gather	  
resources,	  recruitment,	  and	  support.	  	  
	  
7.4   Concluding	  Comments	  on	  Liberia’s	  Civil	  Wars	  
	   The	  insurgent	  groups	  involved	  in	  both	  the	  first	  and	  second	  civil	  wars	  in	  Liberia	  were	  similar	  
in	  a	  number	  of	  respects,	  including	  their	  motivations,	  how	  they	  conducted	  their	  wartime	  practices,	  
and	  their	  disregard	  for	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  The	  readily	  available	  commercial	  and	  
economic	  possibilities	  on	  offer,	  through	  control	  of	  Liberia's	  abundant	  natural	  resources,	  fuelled	  
conflict	  and	  contributed	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  warring	  parties	  (Harris,	  1999).	  All	  six	  of	  the	  insurgent	  
groups	  discussed	  in	  the	  Liberian	  case	  study	  support	  my	  hypothesis	  that	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  than	  secessionist	  groups.	  Instead,	  the	  insurgent	  
groups	  chose	  to	  focus	  their	  resources	  on	  their	  military	  objectives	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  power	  and	  
economic	  personal	  gain.	  This	  is	  evident	  through	  the	  violent	  military	  techniques	  adopted	  by	  the	  rebel	  













8   Discussion	  of	  the	  Case	  Studies	  
As	  has	  been	  shown	  by	  this	  paper	  and	  previous	  scholarship	  rebel	  governance	  takes	  place	  in	  a	  
myriad	  of	  ways	  (Huang,	  2016).	  The	  analysis	  in	  this	  paper	  has	  provided	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  some	  
insurgent	  and	  rebel	  groups	  engage	  with	  civilians,	  and	  how	  insurgent	  groups	  act	  during	  civil	  wars.	  I	  
hypothesized	  that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  have	  more	  incentive	  to	  provide	  rebel	  governance	  in	  
their	  bid	  to	  win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  civilians,	  gain	  widespread	  united	  support	  for	  their	  cause,	  
and	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy	  as	  a	  sovereign	  authority.	  Overall,	  the	  three	  case	  studies	  of	  
Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  Liberia	  offer	  support	  and	  contradictions	  for	  this	  hypothesis.	  	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Frequency	  of	  expected	  and	  evident	  rebel	  governance	  
	   Frequency	   Expected	  rebel	  
governance	  
Evidence	  of	  rebel	  
governance	  
%	  with	  rebel	  
governance	  
Secessionist	   3	   3	   2	   67	  
Non-­‐secessionist	   11	   0	   3	   27	  
	  
	  
When	  looking	  at	  Table	  4,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  variation	  in	  rebel	  governance	  exists,	  and	  insurgent	  
groups	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  follow	  a	  single	  theory	  put	  forward	  by	  political	  scientists.	  Whilst	  it	  is	  evident	  
that	  there	  was	  a	  skewed	  number	  of	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  discussed,	  the	  evidence	  
provided	  in	  Table	  4	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  case	  of	  the	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  supported	  the	  
hypothesis	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  rate	  than	  the	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  Two-­‐thirds	  (67%)	  of	  
the	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  discussed	  supported	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  This	  
is	  compared	  to	  the	  27%	  of	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  provided	  evidence	  of	  rebel	  




evidence	  of	  rebel	  governance	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  three-­‐times	  more	  than	  the	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups.	  
	  
The	  case	  of	  Liberia,	  for	  example,	  presents	  six	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  all	  of	  whom	  
did	  not	  implement	  any	  evident	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  offering	  support	  for	  the	  hypothesis.	  
Liberia’s	  first	  and	  second	  civil	  wars	  were	  fought	  with	  the	  primary	  motive	  of	  seizing	  power	  and	  taking	  
control	  of	  Liberia’s	  natural	  resources.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  Liberian	  insurgent	  groups	  did	  not	  implement	  
any	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  interacted	  with	  civilians	  on	  a	  primarily	  violent	  basis	  lends	  support	  to	  
the	  hypothesis.	  The	  cases	  of	  Ethiopia	  and	  Somalia	  are	  much	  more	  complex.	  In	  some	  instances,	  for	  
example	  the	  SNC	  in	  Somalia	  and	  the	  EPLF	  and	  the	  EPRP	  in	  Eritrea	  and	  Ethiopia	  respectively,	  the	  
insurgent	  groups	  acted	  as	  hypothesised.	  The	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  did	  not	  implement	  
rebel	  governance,	  as	  they	  did	  not	  need	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  legitimacy,	  nor	  were	  they	  concerned	  
with	  winning	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  civilians	  or	  offering	  a	  unified	  cause	  for	  non-­‐combatants	  to	  
mobilise	  around.	  	  
	  
Two	  of	  the	  secessionist	  groups	  discussed,	  the	  Somali	  National	  Movement	  (SNM)	  and	  the	  
Eritrean	  People’s	  Liberation	  Front	  (EPLF),	  fulfilled	  the	  hypothesis.	  Both	  implemented	  structures	  of	  
rebel	  governance	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  seceding	  from	  the	  state	  and	  becoming	  independent	  entities.	  
Furthermore,	  many	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups	  fit	  the	  hypothesis	  as	  they	  did	  not	  implement	  rebel	  
governance.	  This	  includes	  the	  Ethiopian	  People’s	  Revolutionary	  Party	  (EPRP),	  the	  Somali	  National	  
Congress	  (SNC),	  and	  the	  six	  insurgent	  groups	  discussed	  in	  the	  Liberia	  case	  study.	  The	  case	  of	  the	  
Eritrean	  Liberation	  Front	  (ELF),	  a	  secessionist	  insurgent	  group,	  also	  contradicts	  my	  hypothesis.	  I	  
subsequently	  hypothesise	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  infighting	  and	  their	  
subsequent	  conflict	  with	  EPLF,	  a	  splinter	  group	  of	  the	  ELF.	  The	  cases	  of	  the	  Islamic	  Courts	  Union	  




contradict	  the	  hypothesis.	  These	  are	  instances	  of	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  implementing	  
widespread	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  	  
	  
	   Overall,	  it	  appears	  there	  was	  not	  a	  coherent	  trend	  in	  the	  data	  across	  the	  countries	  discussed.	  
Whilst	  some	  of	  the	  insurgent	  groups	  in	  Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  Liberia	  supported	  the	  hypothesis,	  the	  
anomalies	  of	  the	  ICU,	  al-­‐Shabaab	  and	  the	  TPLF	  provide	  contradictory	  evidence.	  This	  indicates	  that	  
there	  may	  be	  other	  elements	  that	  interact	  with	  the	  insurgent	  groups’	  motivation	  to	  determine	  
































9   Conclusion	  
This	  paper	  has	  presented	  an	  assortment	  of	  evidence	  through	  political	  and	  historical	  analysis	  of	  
three	  case	  studies,	  which	  both	  supports	  and	  contradicts	  of	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  I	  
argue	  that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  for	  three	  
factors:	  first,	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  governance	  structures	  
as	  an	  incentive	  to	  win	  the	  ‘hearts	  and	  minds’	  of	  the	  local	  populace	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups	  (Stubbs,	  1989;	  Grynkewich,	  2008).	  Second,	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups,	  which	  are	  often	  
ethnic	  in	  nature,	  are	  more	  often	  fighting	  for	  a	  unified	  cause	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  
In	  order	  to	  convince	  civilians	  to	  mobilise	  around	  their	  agenda,	  a	  system	  of	  rebel	  governance	  is	  
utilised	  (Montalvo	  and	  Reynal-­‐Querol,	  2005).	  Third,	  secessionist	  groups	  are	  looking	  to	  secede	  from	  
the	  existing	  state	  to	  create	  a	  new	  independent	  state,	  therefore	  they	  need	  to	  gain	  recognition	  and	  
legitimacy	  as	  a	  sovereign	  territorial	  unit	  (Kimeny,	  Mbaku,	  and	  Moyo,	  2010).	  One	  way	  that	  
secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  show	  that	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  ruling	  and	  gain	  legitimacy	  from	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international	  actors	  is	  to	  implement	  governance	  structures	  that	  mirror	  those	  of	  a	  
sovereign	  state.	  The	  cases	  of	  Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  Liberia	  provide	  an	  array	  of	  evidence,	  both	  in	  
support	  and	  in	  contradiction	  of	  this	  theory.	  	  
	  
The	  cases	  of	  the	  EPLF	  in	  the	  Ethiopian	  civil	  war	  and	  the	  SNM	  in	  the	  Somali	  civil	  war	  provide	  
evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  hypothesis.	  In	  both	  instances,	  the	  two	  insurgent	  groups	  had	  secessionist	  
motivations.	  There	  is	  an	  abundance	  of	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  both	  insurgent	  groups	  implemented	  vast	  
systems	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  including	  education	  systems	  and	  the	  implementation	  of	  health	  care	  
infrastructures.	  Additionally,	  there	  is	  evidence	  that	  the	  political	  and	  social	  rights	  of	  the	  civilians	  in	  
their	  respective	  territories	  were	  advanced	  under	  both	  insurgent	  groups.	  The	  EPLF	  in	  Eritrea	  and	  the	  
SNM	  in	  Somaliland	  managed	  to	  win	  widespread	  support	  from	  the	  local	  populations	  as	  they	  won	  the	  




advance	  daily	  life	  within	  their	  established	  territories.	  Additionally,	  the	  EPLF	  and	  the	  SNM	  were	  
fighting	  for	  a	  unified	  cause,	  which,	  in	  both	  instances,	  was	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  independent	  
territories	  of	  Eritrea	  and	  Somaliland	  respectively.	  Both	  the	  EPLF	  and	  the	  SNM	  had	  the	  goal	  of	  
creating	  independent	  states,	  thus	  they	  had	  the	  aim	  of	  gaining	  legitimacy	  and	  recognition	  from	  both	  
domestic	  and	  international	  actors.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  the	  two	  insurgent	  groups	  implemented	  
governance	  structures	  in	  their	  respective	  territories	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  mimicking	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  
nation	  state.	  The	  EPLF	  and	  the	  SNM,	  therefore,	  support	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  and	  hypothesis	  
established	  in	  Section	  3.	  	  
	  
Utilising	  secondary	  sources,	  including	  fieldwork	  in	  the	  conflict	  zones	  and	  interviews	  from	  
combatants	  and	  non-­‐combatants,	  this	  thesis	  has	  used	  an	  abundance	  of	  sources	  to	  broaden	  current	  
understanding	  of	  variations	  in	  rebel	  governance.	  By	  bringing	  together	  these	  previously	  separate	  
sources,	  this	  thesis	  has	  provided	  new	  insights	  into	  how	  rebels	  act	  within	  civil	  wars	  and	  how	  rebels	  
and	  civilians	  interact.	  By	  analysing	  the	  three	  civil	  war	  case	  studies,	  I	  found	  that	  insurgent	  groups	  do	  
not	  necessarily	  follow	  the	  expected	  trends	  for	  insurgent-­‐civilian	  interactions.	  Throughout	  the	  
research,	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  how	  rebels	  act	  in	  civil	  wars	  and	  how	  they	  interact	  with	  civilians	  does	  
not	  necessarily	  follow	  a	  set	  pattern.	  The	  case	  studies	  of	  Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  Liberia	  are	  indicative	  
of	  how	  complex	  insurgent	  groups’	  actions	  and	  their	  interactions	  with	  civilians	  can	  be.	  By	  looking	  at	  
Table	  4,	  however,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  case	  studies	  are	  bias	  in	  favour	  of	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  
groups.	  This	  occurred	  due	  to	  the	  process	  of	  randomization	  used	  for	  case	  selection.	  The	  lack	  of	  
variation	  in	  the	  types	  of	  insurgent	  groups	  may	  have	  impacted	  my	  findings.	  A	  more	  even	  selection	  of	  
secessionist	  and	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  may	  have	  furthered	  my	  theory,	  by	  providing	  
more	  evidence	  in	  support	  of	  the	  secessionist	  hypothesis	  (H1).	  
	  
	  The	  research	  suggested	  that	  whilst	  some	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  do	  implement	  




of	  the	  ICU	  and	  al-­‐Shabaab	  in	  Somalia	  and	  the	  TPLF	  in	  Ethiopia,	  for	  example,	  contradict	  the	  theory	  
that	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  systems	  of	  rebel	  governance	  than	  
non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  Future	  research	  into	  rebel	  governance	  needs	  to	  focus	  on	  
insurgent	  groups	  who	  present	  as	  anomalies	  to	  the	  prevailing	  theories.	  The	  case	  of	  al-­‐Shabaab,	  for	  
example,	  raises	  questions	  about	  radical	  Islamist	  groups.	  Future	  research	  should	  assess	  whether	  the	  
goal	  of	  implementing	  an	  Islamic	  state	  contributes	  to	  Islamic	  insurgent	  groups	  mirroring	  the	  actions	  
of	  secessionist	  insurgents.	  The	  motivation	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  state	  by	  replacing	  the	  existing	  state	  
structures,	  rather	  than	  seceding	  certain	  territory,	  may	  influence	  how	  insurgent	  groups	  act	  and	  
contribute	  to	  them	  exhibiting	  similar	  characteristics	  to	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  Additionally,	  
the	  case	  of	  the	  TPLF	  presents	  an	  anomaly	  to	  the	  theory	  that	  secessionist	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
implement	  rebel	  governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  groups.	  The	  TPLF,	  a	  group	  motivated	  by	  
overthrowing	  the	  existing	  regime,	  effected	  a	  wide	  system	  of	  governance,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  
healthcare	  and	  education.	  The	  concentration	  of	  the	  TPLF’s	  governance	  structures	  in	  the	  ethnically	  
homogeneous	  region	  of	  Tigray	  in	  northern	  Ethiopia	  indicates	  that	  the	  ethnic	  cohesion	  of	  the	  TPLF	  
may	  have	  influenced	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  insurgent	  group.	  Future	  research	  should	  consider	  ethnic	  
homogeneity	  and	  heterogeneity	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  rebel	  governance.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
the	  ELF,	  a	  secessionist	  group	  that	  did	  not	  implement	  rebel	  governance,	  their	  preoccupation	  with	  
infighting	  and	  internal	  divisions	  may	  have	  been	  a	  hindrance	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  secessionist	  
objective.	  Future	  research	  should	  consider	  how	  the	  cohesiveness	  of	  an	  insurgent	  group	  affects	  the	  
likelihood	  of	  rebel	  governance,	  regardless	  of	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  insurgent	  group.	  The	  evidence	  
shows	  that	  rebel	  groups	  do	  not	  act	  in	  one	  coherent	  manner	  and	  are	  motivated	  to	  implement	  rebel	  
governance	  for	  an	  array	  of	  factors.	  Ultimately,	  rebel	  governance	  in	  civil	  wars	  is	  an	  increasingly	  
important	  facet	  of	  war-­‐making	  and	  it	  requires	  a	  lot	  more	  attention.	  
	  
This	  thesis	  sought	  to	  move	  beyond	  existing	  explanations	  of	  variations	  in	  rebel	  governance.	  It	  




analyses	  of	  three	  civil	  wars,	  Ethiopia,	  Somalia,	  and	  Liberia.	  Whilst	  literature	  on	  rebel	  governance	  was	  
relatively	  sparse,	  the	  research	  presented	  here	  presents	  some	  contradictions.	  This	  thesis	  has	  
contributed	  to	  an	  emerging	  literature	  on	  rebel	  governance.	  The	  research	  presented	  here	  offers	  a	  
theoretical	  basis	  as	  to	  why	  secessionist	  insurgent	  groups	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  implement	  rebel	  
governance	  than	  non-­‐secessionist	  insurgent	  groups.	  Whilst	  the	  research	  presented	  some	  anomalies,	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